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This Article explores an important question thatfollows in the wake of last
Term's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell: When employee rights under the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and employer religious commitments
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conflict, which will have priority? This is a surprisingly difficult question to
which multiple statutory regimes arguably apply. First, there is the NLRA
itself The NLRA does not exempt religious employers on its face, but the
Supreme Court nonetheless construed it to exclude certain religious employers
in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop. Catholic Bishop is remarkable: as an exercise of
constitutional avoidance the Court adopted an implausible reading of the
NLRA in order to avoid an improbable constitutionalquestion. In addition, the
decision's vague language has proven difficult to apply to new contexts,
leading to pervasive conflicts between the NationalLabor Relations Board and
the circuit courts over its meaning. Yet, despite these many flaws, Catholic
Bishop has heldfast, even as the law of religious exercise has overtaken it.
There is also the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which
allows exemptions from federal laws that conflict with religious adherents'
sincere beliefs, unless there is no less restrictive means of satisfying a
compelling government interest. But RFRA's application leaves many
unanswered questions in the labor law context: Does the NLRA qualify as the
least restrictive means of satisfying a compelling government interest? Should
accommodations be available even if they shift costs onto employees? And if
so, how could accommodations be structured to protect religious adherents
while minimizing burdens on others?
This Article offers answers to the complex questions associated with
statutory religious accommodation claims arising in the labor law context.
First, it proposes a new framework for courts to interpret legislative
enactments that arguably override constitutional avoidance decisions, like
Catholic Bishop. Applying this principle, it argues that courts should treat
RFRA-a statute that makes clear Congress's preferred method of
accommodating religious objectors to labor law-as having legislatively
overturned Catholic Bishop. Second, the Article analyzes the thorny questions
that will arise when courts apply RFRA in the NLRA context. Ultimately, the
Article concludes that the NLRA constitutes the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest. However, recognizing that some
appellate courts may reach the opposite conclusion, it also presents a model of
limited accommodationsfor religious employers that are carefully shaped to
minimize burdens on employees.

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the Supreme Court's high-profile decision in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 courts and federal administrative agencies will face
new types of religious exemption claims from non-profit and closely held forprofit employers. It is a virtual certainty that some of these employers will
claim exemption from their obligations under the National Labor Relations Act
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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("NLRA" or "the Act")-generally, to respect workers' rights to engage in
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, and to bargain collectively
with elected unions2-because of conflicts between these obligations and their
3
religious beliefs.
But the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") and the
lower federal courts will not be drawing on a blank canvas when they address
the scope of employer religious exemptions from labor law; they have
previously considered a range of arguments that certain employers should be
exempt from labor law for religious reasons, with varying results. 4 Many of
these cases attempt to apply a thirty-five-year-old Supreme Court decision,
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,5 in which the Court construed the NLRA
to exempt parochial high school teachers as a matter of constitutional
avoidance. 6 That relatively short decision created considerable disagreement
among the Board and the lower federal courts that persists to this day; more
than three decades after Catholic Bishop was announced, it is still disputed
whether and to what extent it applies outside the context of religious
elementary and secondary school teachers. 7 In fact, the Board's most recent
attempt to faithfully apply Catholic Bishop resulted in a sharply divided
December 2014 decision in the Pacific Lutheran University case involving
8
adjuncts at that religiously affiliated university.
Arguably, then, religious non-profits have two possible statutory sources of
exemption from the NLRA: the Act itself (as construed by the Court in
Catholic Bishop) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 9 But
this Article argues that this two-track approach is contrary to congressional
intent and that there is instead only one statutory source of labor law
exemptions for religious employers.' 0 Specifically, it argues that the Board and
the courts should treat Catholic Bishop-in which the Court applied an
especially aggressive form of constitutional avoidance to the NLRA-as
having been legislatively overruled by RFRA.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d) (2012).
3 There will be some number of employers that conclude (or have already concluded)

2

that aspects of their obligations under the NLRA conflict with their sincere religious beliefs.
Other employers may be tempted to feign religious objections in order to obtain what they
perceive as a competitive advantage.
I Infra Section I.A.3.
5 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
6

Id. at 507.

7 Infra Section

I.A.2.
Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 (2014).
9 There is also the possibility of a freestanding constitutional claim. A small number of
employees and employers may be exempt from labor law under the ministerial exception or
the church autonomy doctrine, while others may attempt a Free Exercise claim. These
arguments are briefly discussed in Section I.A.4 infra, but they are generally beyond the
scope of this Article.
10 Infra Section I.C.
8
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Aggressive constitutional avoidance decisions-those in which courts adopt
improbable or even contraindicated statutory interpretations-are sometimes
justified by normative preferences to protect constitutional values. However,
those normative preferences only go so far-court decisions that effectively
rewrite federal statutes to avoid constitutional questions should not then
become practically impervious to congressional override. Instead, Congress
should be able to overcome these decisions relatively easily by simply
indicating its preferred approach for dealing with the problem. Following this
rule, Catholic Bishop was overruled by RFRA, with which Congress amended
the NLRA (like all other federal statutes) to indicate how employers' requests
for religious exemptions should be treated. Accordingly, RFRA, along with the
First Amendment itself, should determine when employers (both for- and nonprofit) are entitled to religious accommodation of their obligations under the
NLRA; Catholic Bishop should no longer play a role in this determination.
This Article then discusses key remaining questions about religious
employers and labor law under RFRA. In short, RFRA entitles persons
(including closely held corporations) to accommodations when federal law
substantially burdens exercise of their sincere religious beliefs, unless the
federal law is the least restrictive way of furthering a compelling government
interest. Thus, several questions will arise when employers assert religious
exemptions from their obligations under the NLRA, which the Article
addresses in turn. It begins by discussing threshold inquiries concerning how
the NLRB and the courts can determine whether religious objections to
collective bargaining are sincere-particularly considering the economic
incentive to make insincere claims-and whether an employer's religious
exercise has been substantially burdened. Then, the Article turns to the critical
question of whether the NLRA is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest. The Board and a few U.S. Courts of Appeals
have previously found that the NLRA meets this standard, although with
limited explanation. This Article takes up where they left off, fleshing out the
argument that the NRLA is the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling state interests in labor peace and worker voice. 1I
However, it is possible (and even likely) that some courts will reach the
opposite conclusion and decide that the NLRA is not the least restrictive means
of meeting any compelling government interest. Accordingly, this Article goes
on to discuss how the Board might structure religious accommodations to
minimize impingements on employees' rights to act collectively for improved
12
working conditions.
This Article has two parts. Part I first reviews Catholic Bishop and its
reception before the NLRB and the courts. It then explains why the best
justifications for the canon of constitutional avoidance assume that Congress
has the practical ability to legislatively overturn avoidance decisions. Finally, it

II Infra Section II.C.
12 Infra Section II.D.
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argues that these principles lead to the perhaps surprising conclusion that
RFRA should be read as having overturned Catholic Bishop. Part II discusses
the application of RFRA in the context of labor law.
I.

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CLAIMS IN THE LABOR LAW CONTEXT

The NLRB's recent decision in Pacific Lutheran University to accept
jurisdiction over a group of adjunct professors at a religiously affiliated
university is just the most recent example of the Board's ongoing struggle to
apply the NLRA's exemption for certain religiously affiliated employers,
13
which was read into the statute by the Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop.
This Part explains how that exemption came to be and criticizes the unwieldy
and opaque Catholic Bishop decision. Then, it argues that principles of
statutory interpretation and basic separation of powers should lead to the
conclusion that RFRA legislatively overruled CatholicBishop.
Non-ProfitReligious Employers and Catholic Bishop

A.

The NLRB has a longstanding policy of declining jurisdiction over
employees "who are involved in effectuating the religious purpose" of their
employer. 14 However, the Board does assert jurisdiction over employees of
religiously affiliated employers when those employees have essentially secular
jobs. 15 The modem history of this approach to religious exemptions from labor
law begins in 1979 with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago.16 As this Section discusses, Catholic Bishop's legacy was
to set labor law on a separate-and at times quite divergent-path than other
types of religious exemption claims brought by employers.
1.

NLRB v. CatholicBishop

Catholic Bishop involved a challenge to the NLRB's assertion of
jurisdiction over lay teachers working at parochial high schools.17 After
canvassing the Board's historical position on union representation within

13 Pac. Lutheran Univ, 361 NLRB No. 157, slip op. at 14 (2014) (holding that adjunct

professors were not exempt from NLRA coverage because the university did not hold them
out as performing specific religious functions).
14 JurisdictionalStandards, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictionalstandards [http://perma.cc/R6ZZ-MBQF]; see also St. Edmund's Roman Catholic Church,
337 N.L.R.B. 1260, 1260 (2002) ("[T]he Board will not assert jurisdiction over nonprofit,
religious organizations.").
15 E.g., Catholic Soc. Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. 929, 930 (2010) (holding that the Board has
jurisdiction over employee who did not "inculcate and teach religious values").
16 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that the Board did not have jurisdiction over
teachers in a parochial high school).
17Id. at 491.
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educational institutions, 18 the Court turned to the statutory interpretation
question of whether Congress intended the NLRB to assume oversight over
labor relations between unions and religious employers. It began this
discussion from the premise that "it is incumbent on us to determine whether
the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here would give rise to serious
constitutional questions."' 19 As others have observed (and as is discussed in
greater detail below), this is a particularly strong application of the "modem"
constitutional avoidance canon, in which the Court assesses whether potential
constitutional problems are present, and, if so, seeks a statutory construction-20
even an improbable one-that eliminates the need to answer those questions.
Applying this principle, the Catholic Bishop Court's discussion of the
potential First Amendment problems posed by permitting the NLRB to assert
jurisdiction over parochial high schools was cursory at best. The Court first
identified in its precedent "the critical and unique role of the teacher in
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school."' 21 In support of this
proposition, it cited Lemon v. Kurtzman,22 which had held that certain public
subsidy programs for secular education at religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause. 23 The Court proceeded to discuss whether, under
Lemon's "excessive entanglement" test, "the exercise of the Board's
jurisdiction presents a significant risk that the First Amendment will be
infringed. '24 Here, the Court focused on two potential entanglements: first, that
the Board would assess school administrators' motives in deciding later unfair
labor practice proceedings; and second, that the Board would determine which
18Specifically, the Court observed that the Board declined jurisdiction over educational
institutions until 1970, when it first asserted jurisdiction over private post-secondary
educational employers, extending that rule to primary and secondary schools shortly
thereafter. Id.at 497 ("The Board now asserts jurisdiction over all private, nonprofit,
educational institutions with gross annual revenues that meet its jurisdictional requirements
whether they are secular or religious.").
19Id. at 501.
20 Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (contrasting

"modem avoidance," in which "the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress," from "classical
avoidance," in which the Court uses the potential constitutional problem as a tiebreaker to
choose among competing reasonable interpretations of a statute (quoting Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988))); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 599 (1992)

(stating that the Burger Court applied modem constitutional avoidance principle "most
prominently" in CatholicBishop),
21 CatholicBishop, 440 U.S. at 501.
22 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

23 Id.at 613-14 (holding that the subsidies in question came with promises that would
require policing, which involves "excessive entanglement" between church and state).
24 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502.
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aspects of school administration were mandatory subjects of bargaining. 25 The
Board had not decided either of these questions in Catholic Bishop itself; both
were hypothetical questions that the Court feared might arise in the future.
Nonetheless, the Court concluded, quoting Lemon, that "[t]he substantial
religious character of these church-related schools gives rise to entangling
26
church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid.
Having identified "serious First Amendment questions" that would follow
"from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated
schools," 27 the Court turned to whether there was any available reading of the
NLRA that would eliminate the Board's jurisdiction over parochial schools,
28
and with it, the need to answer the constitutional questions the Court raised.
Here, the Court applied a clear statement rule, 29 concluding that unless the
statute were amended to include affirmative statutory language indicating that
church-operated schools were covered by the Act, they would be deemed
excluded. 30 In other words, the presence of an arguable constitutional question
led the Court to adopt an atypical approach to statutory interpretation--one
that did not focus primarily on effectuating congressional intent as expressed in
the statutory text. 31 Accordingly, it was not enough that the NLRA contains a
broad definition of covered employers, along with a list of specific exclusions
that does not include religious employers. 32 Instead, for the NLRA to cover
those employers, Congress would have to go out of its way to do so-for
example, by stating that the Act covers "all employers, including parochial
schools."

25

26
27
28

Id. at 502-03.
Id.at 503 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616).
Id.at 504.
Id.

29 See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20 at 632 (analyzing the use of "super-

strong clear statement rules," as applied in CatholicBishop, to protect constitutional norms).
30 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504-06 (holding that Congress did not affirmatively state
that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the Act and thus the Court
was not required to read it that way).
31Id. at 507 (Explaining that "in the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to
bring teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board," the Court
will avoid the constitutional questions).
32 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) ("The term 'employer' ... shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any
State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization."
(citation omitted)). This approach is inconsistent with normal principles of statutory
interpretation, such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 455 (1989) ("[B]y
expressly singling out those people to whom it wanted to grant the good, Congress
implicitly decided to deny all others the good.").
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Four dissenters criticized the majority's conclusion in Catholic Bishop on
multiple levels. They both questioned the majority's approach to constitutional
avoidance 33 and its conclusion that the NLRA could plausibly be read to
exclude religious employers under the text of the statute, its legislative history,
or the Court's own precedent. 34 While the dissenters did not then go on to
reach the constitutional question-a question they noted was "not without
difficulty" 35-it is nonetheless telling that they dissented rather than concurred
in the judgment.
2.

Catholic Bishop's Doctrine

As I discuss in the next Section, the Board and the lower federal courts have
not been able to agree on what Catholic Bishop requires. 36 The most recent
chapter in this ongoing saga is the Board's Pacific Lutheran University
decision. 37 That Catholic Bishop's legacy is still in flux is in one sense
surprising-the decision is over three decades old-but then again, it is hardly
a model of clarity. This is in large part because the Court did not specify the
First Amendment principles upon which the decision rested, and in part
because of the Court's flawed understanding of labor law.
One available reading of Catholic Bishop is as a prototype extension of the
Court's church autonomy doctrine; indeed, that is the reading of the case that
Douglas Laycock advanced in a seminal article on that doctrine. 38 Others since
then have arrived at the same conclusion. 39 But this is not to say Catholic

33 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing majority

opinion as "justified solely on the basis of a canon of statutory construction seemingly
invented by the Court for the purpose of deciding this case").
34Id.at 511 ("The interpretation of Nation Labor Relations Act announced by the Court
today is not 'fairly possible."').
35 Id.at 518.
36

On the value of dialogue between the judiciary and the elected branches of

government with respect to statutory interpretation, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-71 (1985) (discussing the capacity of judges to respond to

obsolete statutes); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges,
Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1998) ("Perhaps an open dialogue

between the federal judiciary . . . and the Congress and/or executive branch, would lead to
more enlightened public policy.").
37See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining the enduring difficulties of
applying CatholicBishop).
3'Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1401

(1981) ("Thus, the serious constitutional issue that the Court [in CatholicBishop] avoided
was the question of church autonomy in the labor relations context.").
39 E.g., Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Freedom To Be a Church: Confronting
Challenges to the Right of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 387, 420 (2005)
(explaining that Catholic Bishop "demonstrate[s] that government intrusion into religious
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Bishop is clearly a church autonomy case. 40 The closest the Court came to
making a church autonomy argument explicitly was its observation that the
NLRB had "recognize[d] that its assertion of jurisdiction over teachers in
religious schools constitutes some degree of intrusion into the administration
of the affairs of church-operated schools. '41 Moreover, although church
autonomy was not the main thrust of the school's merits brief before the
Supreme Court, it did cite two church autonomy cases. 42 Yet, the Supreme
Court did not cite either one-a curious choice if the Court really had church
autonomy in mind.
Further, the Supreme Court soon backed off the broad approach to church
autonomy that CatholicBishop might have previewed. Later in the same Term,
the Court decided another church autonomy case relatively narrowly.43 And a
44
few years later, in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,
the Court rejected both Free Exercise and Catholic Bishop-style entanglement
challenges to the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to forprofit enterprises operated by (and in support of) a church. 45 Here, the Tony
and Susan Alamo Foundation's entanglement challenge focused on the FLSA's
recordkeeping and reporting requirements. 46 The Court, however, simply
observed that the "routine and factual inquiries" imposed by the FLSA "bear
no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court has
previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with
religion." 47 Likewise, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc.,48 the Court permitted a sex discrimination case to go forward

organizations and their relationships with their workforce may sometimes infringe their
autonomy").
40 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising
Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1645 (stating that it is "unclear" whether
Catholic Bishop "meant to suggest that any government regulation that interferes with
internal church affairs raises First Amendment problems").
41 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979).
42 Brief for Respondents at ii-iv, Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (No. 77-752), 1978 WL
207227 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manilla, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)).
43 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (holding that a state can resolve church
property disputes as long as the decision is not based on religious doctrine and the court
defers to the church's "resolution of issues of religious doctrine"); see also Douglas
Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 259 (2009) ("[T]he
precise peak for the constitutional right to church autonomy was the three months between
Catholic Bishop and Jones v. Wolf, in the spring of 1979.").
44 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
45 Id. at 305-06 (holding that the FLSA's requirements are secular in nature and not
significantly "intrusive into religious affairs").
46 Id.
41 Id. at 305.

48 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
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against a Christian school, remarking that the school would 49have an
opportunity to litigate its constitutional claim during the merits phase.
Related to whether Catholic Bishop was really a church autonomy case, the
Court has recently recognized a ministerial exception to labor and employment
law, albeit one that cuts with much more precision than Catholic Bishop.50 In
Hosanna-TaborEvangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Court
held that legislatures and courts may not interfere with churches' selection of
ministers, even to enforce important non-discrimination norms. 5 ' However, the
Hosanna-Tabor Court was careful to stress that its decision applied only to
employees who qualified as "ministerial"-a distinction the Catholic Bishop
Court did not make.5 2 Catholic Bishop could have been intended (consciously
or not) as an early, statutory version of the ministerial exception. However,
once the Court finally grappled with the constitutional question instead of
avoiding it, its answer was much more precise.
Catholic Bishop's discussion of the NLRA is no less cursory than its
discussion of the religion clauses. For example, in addressing the possibility
that parochial schools would be forced to cede authority over religious matters
during bargaining, the Court observed that it was unclear what bargaining
subjects were mandatory in the context of education, citing several decisions
interpreting state public sector labor statutes. 53 But public sector labor laws
often operate quite differently than the NLRA, which applies only in the
private sector. 54 One key difference is that public sector labor law often
requires employers and unions that have reached impasse at the bargaining
55
table to resolve their differences by procedures such as interest arbitration.

4 Id.
at 628
o Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707-08

(2012) (finding "ministerial exception" to employment discrimination law grounded in
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
51Id. at 710 ("The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination
statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing
who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission .... The church
must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.").
52 Id. at 708 (describing who may be considered a "minister" and thus covered by the
ministerial exception).
53NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1979).
14 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the NLRA defines
"employer" to exclude governmental employers).
11 Interest arbitration generally involves ceding authority to determine terms and
conditions of employment to an arbitrator, who decides based on facts presented by the
parties. See generally Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The
Alternative to the Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 153 (1987) (describing the practice and scope

of interest arbitration); Charles B. Craver, Public Sector Impasse Resolution Procedures,60
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 779 (1984) (describing the procedural contours of interest arbitration);
Martin H. Malin, Two Models of Interest Arbitration, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 145

20161
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This process, if imposed by law on an unwilling religious employer, could
indeed raise First Amendment problems by requiring the employer to accept
particular employment terms; however, the NLRA neither requires nor
encourages interest arbitration. 56 Instead, it permits an employer who has
reached an impasse during bargaining to unilaterally implement its final
offer.5 7 In other words, the NLRA never requires an employer to accept a
bargaining proposal from a union, much less one that conflicts with the
employer's religious commitments. 58 Yet, the Catholic Bishop Court neither
attempted to identify specific conflicts between bargaining obligations and
religious practice nor confronted the reality that a bargaining mandate carries
with it no obligation to agree to any particular term. 59 Similarly, the Court
discussed the Board's adjudication of unfair labor practice charges alleging
discrimination but did not explain why the Board's inquiry would need to go
beyond a determination of whether the employer's asserted religious
motivations for discharging a (non-ministerial) employee were sincere-an
60
inquiry that courts regularly undertake in other contexts.
As Christopher Lund recently put it, after CatholicBishop, "[n]o one knows
whether, if push came to shove, the government could force collective
bargaining on Catholic schools. All we have are nine Justices cryptically
agreeing that the case presents 'difficult and sensitive questions arising out of
the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.' 6 1 As we will see in
the next Section, this leaves the Board and the courts in a difficult position.

(2013) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of relying on interest arbitration for
impasse resolution).
56See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) ("One of the[] fundamental
policies [of the NLRA] is freedom of contract.").
57 See Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-weprotect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations [http://perma.cc/FL2E-4SCR]
("If after
sufficient good faith efforts, no agreement can be reached, the employer may declare
impasse, and then implement the last offer presented to the union.").
58H.K. Porter,397 U.S. at 108 (holding that NLRB may not "compel agreement" on any
contract term).
19 Some commentators-particularly Douglas Laycock-have argued that even if there is
no specific conflict between the NLRA's requirements and a religious employer's religious
doctrine, the presence of a union with which the employer must bargain could erode church
autonomy and revise religious doctrine over time. Laycock, supra note 38, at 1400
(explaining that interference with "personnel matters [occasioned by application of the
NLRA] interferes with the further development of the religion").
60 Infra Section II.C.2.
61 Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the MinisterialException, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1, 20
(2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi, 440 U.S. 490, 507

(1979)).
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Catholic Bishop at the Board and in the Courts

The Board and the circuit courts continue to apply CatholicBishop to assess
whether religiously affiliated employers are exempt from the NLRA. 62 As it
rests on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, Catholic Bishop has
spawned its own line of NLRB and circuit court cases, which run alongside
First Amendment case law. 63 Ironically, then, because the Catholic Bishop
Court invoked constitutional avoidance-a method sometimes lauded for
facilitating the development of law 64-the decision has become ossified and
entrenched even as the Court's religion clause jurisprudence developed
rapidly, and in a fashion that undermined CatholicBishop's foundation.
The key questions in Catholic Bishop's wake are as follows: First, does
Catholic Bishop apply to employers other than parochial primary and
secondary schools? Second, does Catholic Bishop apply to employees other
than parochial school teachers? Third, by what method should the Board and
the courts analyze the foregoing questions? In some instances, the Board and
the courts are in relative agreement; for example, they generally agree that the
Board may invoke jurisdiction over religiously affiliated employers who
provide secular services, such as religiously affiliated hospitals and childcare
centers. 65 They also agree that the Board may take jurisdiction over employees
who indisputably play no role in their religiously affiliated employer's mission,
such as the custodians at a parochial school. 66 Recently, however, the Board

62

See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. 929, 929 (2010) (applying Catholic

Bishop and determining that Board jurisdiction over residential treatment specialists at
religiously affiliated child welfare agency was proper).
63Id. (discussing application of Catholic Bishop formula).
64 Infra Section I.C (discussing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, its impact postCatholic Bishop, and why the NLRB and the courts should view RFRA as having rejected
the precedent from CatholicBishop).
65 Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining

Under Federaland State LaborLaws: Freedomfrom and Freedomfor, 49 VILL. L. REv. 77,
78, 84 (2004) (listing contexts in which the Board and the Court have found CatholicBishop
does not preclude NLRB jurisdiction over religiously affiliated employers); see also NLRB
v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1302 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "cooks, cook's

helpers, recreation assistants and maintenance workers" at a residential school for boys did
not involve religion to a degree that would preclude NLRB jurisdiction); Catholic Soc.
Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. at 929 (asserting NLRB jurisdiction over religiously affiliated
childcare center in 2-1 decision). But see Catholic Soc. Servs. 355 N.L.R.B. at 931
(Schaumber, M., dissenting) (arguing that residential treatment specialists are like parochial
school teachers).
66 The Board generally assumes jurisdiction over employees who work for employers
that are connected to churches (without being churches themselves) but whose jobs are
unconnected to the religious mission of the employer. E.g., Salvation Army, 345 N.L.R.B.
550, 550 (2005) (asserting jurisdiction over youth resident advisors who did not perform
religious function); Hanna Boys Ctr., 284 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1083 (1987) (taking jurisdiction

in a case involving bargaining unit of childcare workers, cooks, and maintenance employees
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and the federal circuit courts have split over how the decision should apply to
faculty at religious colleges and universities. Although they agree that the key
inquiry is whether the employer is of a "substantial religious character," they
disagree over the application of CatholicBishop to the entanglement question.
Until December 2014, the Board's approach involved a multi-factor inquiry
in which it evaluated "the purpose of the employer's operations, the role of the
unit employees in effectuating that purpose, and the potential effects if the
Board exercised jurisdiction. '67 Within that inquiry, the Board "consider[ed]
such factors as the involvement of the religious institution in the daily
operation of the school, the degree to which the school has a religious mission
and curriculum, and whether religious criteria are used for the appointment and
evaluation of faculty."' 68 In a sense, then, the Board re-created Catholic
Bishop's reasoning by asking the types of questions that would help a decisionmaker determine whether NLRB jurisdiction might create a risk of
entanglement in a subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding. These questions
focused variously on the nature of the employer, the role of the particular
employees in the proposed bargaining unit, and the role played by religion in
the relationship between the employer and the bargaining unit employees.
However, following Catholic Bishop's lead, the Board's inquiry did not focus
on the scope of the specific conflicts between an employer's religious
69
commitments and labor law.
The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected the NLRB's approach in University of
Great Falls, concluding that such a case-by-case approach itself risked the
excessive entanglement that concerned the Catholic Bishop Court. 70 Instead,
the D.C. Circuit asks only whether the educational institution (1) "'holds itself
out to students, faculty and community' as providing a religious educational
environment;" (2) "is organized as a 'nonprofit;"' and (3) "is affiliated with, or
owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious
whose roles were entirely unconnected from the employers' religious mission), enforced,
940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991); cf St. Edmund's Roman Catholic Church, 337 N.L.R.B.
1260, 1260 (2002) (declining jurisdiction over janitors who were directly employed by
church, and citing similar cases).
67 Univ. of Great Falls, 331 N.L.R.B. 1663, 1664 (2000), vacated, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).

68

Id. at 1664-65.

69 Id. at 1664 (stating that the Board's post-CatholicBishop decisions have focused on
the "substantial religious character" of employers and whether assertion of Board
jurisdiction would "present a risk of significantly infringing on that employer's First
Amendment rights").
70 Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Here too we
have the NLRB trolling through the beliefs of the University, making determinations about
its religious mission, and that mission's centrality to the 'primary purpose' of the
University."); see also Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 398 (1st Cir.
1985) (en banc) (Breyer, J.) (concluding, in a 3-3 decision, that NLRB could not take
jurisdiction over faculty union at religious university).
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organization, or with an entity, membership of which is determined, at least in
part, with reference to religion."'7' As to the risk that an employer might falsely
assert a religious belief in order to evade Board jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit
stated "[w]here a school, college, or university holds itself out publicly as a
'
religious institution, '[w]e cannot doubt that [it] sincerely holds this view.' "72
This test has the advantage of being predictable and easy to apply; conversely,
it will result in many more exemptions from NLRA coverage, including in
cases where the relevant employees are not integral to the employer's religious
mission-a key factor for the Catholic Bishop Court.
The Board declined to adopt the D.C. Circuit's approach and recently
formulated a new test in the Pacific Lutheran University case. 73 The school in
that case, Pacific Lutheran University ("PLU"), took the position that it was
exempt from the NLRA's coverage under Catholic Bishop because of its
religious character.74 In the course of briefing before the NLRB, the school
described its religious tradition but not the conflict (if any) between its
religious practice and the NLRA's requirements. 75 Holding that it had
jurisdiction over the school, three members of the Board adopted a new twopart test. Under that test, the university must first demonstrate "that it holds
itself out as providing a religious educational environment. '76 Once it has done
that, it "must then show that it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as
'77
performing a religious function.
The Pacific Lutheran University Board explained that its new test grew from
its understanding of Catholic Bishop, which required that it avoid "any
intrusive inquiry into the character or sincerity of a university's religious
views." 78 And indeed, a sincerity inquiry does seem to be foreclosed by
Catholic Bishop: the Court identified the risk of "inquiry into the good faith of
the position asserted by the clergy-administrators" during an unfair labor
practice proceeding as a problematic aspect of Board jurisdiction over religious
schools. 79 But of course, courts regularly consider a putative religious
"' Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1343.

72 Id. at 1344 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
73 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 5 (2014).
74 PLU's Brief in Support of Review at 1, Pac. Lutheran Univ., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 157
(2014) (No. 19-RC-102521), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581469f72
[http://perma.cc/5S7Z-M6AT] (arguing that the Board should adopt the Great Falls threeprong test because the "substantial religious character violates the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment" and PLU is clearly exempt from the NLRA under the Great Falls test).
75 Id. at 2-11; see also Employer's Request for Review at 4-13, Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361
N.L.R.B. No. 157 (No. 19-RC-102521), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/
0903 1d45812f58f4 [http://perma.cc/J2Y7-LQJ4] (explaining the importance of religion to
PLU and the university's ties to the Lutheran Church).
76Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 1.
77 Id.

78Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
79 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
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objector's sincerity in other religious freedom cases;80 this limitation is
imposed by Catholic Bishop but not by the First Amendment.
Instead, the first part of the Board's new test stands in as a sort of proxy for
a sincerity inquiry, but without any "intrusive" questioning. It adopts the first
two prongs of the D.C. Circuit's three-prong test: whether the college or
university (1) "holds itself out to students, faculty and the community as
providing a religious educational environment[;" and (2) "is organized as a
nonprofit. 8 1 The second prong, the Board wrote, "provides an objective way
of differentiating between a church or religion's profit-making ventures and its
endeavors to carry out its religious mission."8 2 However, the Pacific Lutheran
University Board wisely rejected the third prong of the D.C. Circuit's test
(which required the school to be affiliated with a recognized religious order);
certainly constituted an unconstitutional
that prong would have almost
83
preference among religions.
The second part of the Board's new test-"whether the university holds out
its petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating and
maintaining [a religious] environment" 4-asks whether "faculty members are
subject to employment-related decisions that are based on religious
considerations. '85 Again, the focus on how the university "holds out" its
faculty members is aimed at avoiding too much scrutiny of the religious
institution. Apparently the "holding out" inquiry is all there is: the Board "will
not seek to look behind [job descriptions, employment contracts, faculty
handbooks, statements to accrediting bodies, and statements to prospective and
current faculty and students] to determine what specific role petitioned-for
or inspect
faculty actually play in fulfilling the religious mission of a school
86
the university's actual practice with respect to faculty members.
Still, a dispute between the Pacific Lutheran University majority and dissent
about how the test would apply to PLU faculty shows that this prong is hardly
going to be uncontroversial or even easy to apply. The majority wrote that
80 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (holding that a prisoner bringing a
religious free exercise claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
must show "that the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious
belief"); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 335, 340 (1970) (holding that "if an individual
deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source or content but
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience" then that person's beliefs are sincere
and meaningful); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 163 (1965) ("The test of [religious]
belief... is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God .... ).
81 Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157, slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Univ. of Great
Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343-44 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
82

Id. at 7.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 10 n.19.

86

Id. at 9.
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"when the university ...asserts a commitment to diversity and academic
freedom," it puts forth "the message that religion has no bearing on faculty
members' job duties or responsibilities. '87 The dissenters disagreed, arguing
that such a commitment can be part of a university's system of religious
beliefs, and not just a concession to secular higher education norms. 88
The dissenters also argued that the majority was not applying Catholic
Bishop in the spirit in which it was intended. They argued that the Board must
"avoid striving for jurisdictional boundaries that could violate the First
Amendment. '89 In other words, the dissenters thought the Board should
"interpret the Act to avoid even the risk of a constitutional conflict."90
Accordingly, they found the question a simple one: reasoning by analogy, if
the Board may not take jurisdiction over lay teachers in a parochial school, it
also may not take jurisdiction over lay faculty at a religious university. 91
Despite winning before the Board, the union in PacificLutheran University
withdrew its petition shortly after the Board's decision came down. Thus, there
will be no appeal in that case. However, the new test will be applied in several
pending cases also involving adjuncts at religiously affiliated colleges and
universities and reach a circuit court once a union wins one of those elections.
4. Post-CatholicBishop Developments in Religious Liberty Law
There is one final piece of groundwork: the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. 92 This Section briefly discusses RFRA in order to set up the next Section,
which argues that RFRA overruled Catholic Bishop.
In the years after Catholic Bishop, the Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence
became increasingly resistant to accommodation claims, culminating in
93
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.
For example, in United States v. Lee, 94 the Court rejected a Free Exercise claim

brought by an Amish employer who, together with his employees, objected to
withholding and paying social security tax. 95 The Lee Court first noted that the
17 Id. at
88

8.
Id. at 32 (Johnson, M., dissenting) ("Contrary to the majority, 'diversity' is a belief

that can indeed be wholeheartedly consonant with and part of a religious belief system; so is
'academic freedom."').
89

Id.at 28.

90 Id.

91Id.(arguing that the logic of Catholic Bishop requires the Board to decline jurisdiction
because the situation in Pacific Lutheran University is "substantively identical" to that in
Catholic Bishop).
92 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4).
93 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
94 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
95Id.at 254-55, 261 (holding that the State's overriding governmental interest in
maintaining the Social Security System justified a limitation on religious liberty when
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government did not question the sincerity of the Amish defendants'
"religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of
assistance contemplated by the social security system. '96 On the other hand,
the government did question whether the asserted conflict between that
religious belief and paying social security was real. 97 However, the Court
refused to undertake that inquiry, stating that "[i]t is not within 'the judicial
function and judicial competence' ... to determine whether appellee or the
Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; '[c]ourts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.' 98
Once the conflict between the Social Security Act and the Amish
defendants' religious practice was established, the Court considered whether
the burden on religious practice was justified by "an overriding governmental
interest." 99 Here, the Court easily found that the government's interest in the
integrity of the social security system was "very high." 100 Finally, the Court
completed the last step of the Yoder/Sherbert analysis, concluding that there
was no workable way to accommodate the many potential religious objections
that taxpayers might raise in the future.101 Thus, the Court concluded that
"[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of
on the statutory schemes
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed
10 2
which are binding on others in that activity.'
The Court then went further, rejecting the Sherbert analysis for most
purposes in Smith.10 3 The Smith majority observed that the Court had "never
invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the
religious individuals enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice). Interestingly, the
Amish defendants in Lee did not even argue that enforcement of the Social Security Act
caused excessive entanglement, despite the fact that Lee was decided three years after
Catholic Bishop and three years before Alamo Foundation.See generally Brief for Appellee
Edwin D. Lee, Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (No. 80-767).
96 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. Whether beliefs are sincerely held is the first step in the

Yoder/Sherbert analysis. This is followed by an inquiry into whether the beliefs are "unduly
burden[ed]" by the law. If both questions are answered in the affirmative, courts must then
apply strict scrutiny. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
97 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257.
98 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716
(1981)).
99 Id. at 257-58.

100 Id. at 259. Significantly, the Court viewed the potential impact on the social security
system in the aggregate, rather than simply asking whether that system would be
compromised should the individual objectors in Lee prevail. id.
101Id. at 260 ("The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their
religious beliefs.").
102 Id. at 261.
103 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
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denial of unemployment compensation."' 104 Of course, as a statutory decision,
Catholic Bishop played no part in this analysis. Indeed, it was not even cited in
the parties' briefs. Thus, the Court held that YoderlSherbert strict scrutiny did
not apply to Free Exercise challenges to "generally applicable prohibitions of
social harmful conduct" as well as "other aspects of public policy ... "105
However, it may still be possible to challenge laws that do not qualify as
06
neutral and generally applicable under the Free Exercise Clause.
The Smith Court left open the possibility that legislatures would create
statutory exemptions for religious adherents. 07 Congress soon did just that,
enacting RFRA in order to repudiate Smith and restore the Yoder/Sherbert test
or something like it.' 0 8 In its present form, RFRA mandates that the federal
government "shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless the
"application of that burden.., is in furtherance of a compelling government
interest... [and] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest."' 0 9 However, RFRA is explicit that it does not make
any adjustment to the Court's Establishment Clause standards."10
So far, this Section has sketched the development of the law of religion as it
relates to employers' workplace decisions outside of labor law, and the entirely
different developmental path pursued by the NLRB and the courts as they
sought to apply Catholic Bishop to determine the extent of the Board's
jurisdiction over religious employers. The next Section argues that Catholic
Bishop should be discarded in light of RFRA.
B.

Whither Catholic Bishop?
As just described, there exists a patchwork of potentially applicable
exemptions from the NLRA. Some non-profit, religiously affiliated
104

Id. at 883.

105 Id. at 885.
106 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A
law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead,Long
Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 850, 864 (2001) ("[I]f a law is either not neutral or not generally applicable, it
must pass through the gauntlet of superlatives that is strict scrutiny and will be upheld only
if it a governmental interest of 'the highest order' and is narrowly tailored in pursuit of that
truly compelling interest." (footnote omitted)).
107 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (explaining that "a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its
legislation" and observing that several states have passed such laws).
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (2012); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859-60 (2015)
(describing how Smith was superseded by RFRA).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b).
110 RFRA, as well as the Court's interpretation of that statute in Hobby Lobby, is
discussed in Section I.B, infra.
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employers-certainly parochial schools, maybe religiously affiliated
universities, and doubtfully other religiously affiliated nonprofits--can
continue to claim exemption from the Act under Catholic Bishop, though
continued litigation about what that case means is a near certainty. And then
there is RFRA, which covers nearly all employers, including non-profit and
closely held for-profit employers' 1' that are not eligible for an exemption under
Catholic Bishop.1 12 Finally, where statutory exemptions fail, it is possible that
employers could make freestanding First Amendment arguments. These are
outside the scope of this article, but could include ministerial exemption claims
as to qualifying employees as well as possible church autonomy claims, and
conceivably even Free Exercise Clause claims, were a Court to determine that
the NLRA was not neutral and generally applicable.
This state of affairs is both normatively and doctrinally undesirable. First, it
leaves a tremendous amount of uncertainty for religiously affiliated employers
and their employees; the passage of thirty-five years has failed to resolve the
proper application of CatholicBishop, and Hobby Lobby adds to the mix a host
of unresolved questions about RFRA. Thus, when employers arguably qualify
for an exemption, unions, employers, and employees may fight a contentious
battle over whether employees should vote in favor of union representation at
all, only to have a cloud of uncertainty hover over their ultimate decision for
the years that it can take to conclusively resolve the threshold question of
NLRA applicability. 13 Even if the NLRA is ultimately deemed to apply,
"I Corporate law scholars have observed both that there is no single definition of
"closely held," and that some very large corporations qualify as closely held under common
definitions of that term. See Stephanie Armour & Rachel Feintzeig, Hobby Lobby Ruling
Raises Question: What Does 'Closely Held' Mean?, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hobby-lobby-ruling-begs-question-what-does-closely-heldmean-1404154577 [http://perma.cc/GF2A-WHK8]; Ellen Aprille, Hobby Lobby and the
Tax Definition of Closely Held Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/hobby-lobby-and-the-tax-definition-of-closelyheld-corporation.html [http://perma.cc/5YSY-KSZL]; Anne Tucker, The Meaning of Hobby
Lobby: Bedrooms, Boardrooms & Burdens, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014),

http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/the-meaning-of-hobby-lobby-bedroomsboardrooms-burdens.html [http://perma.cc/F9JM-EULL]. This question is beyond the scope
of this Article, though it will likely add to the confusion surrounding employers'
entitlements to RFRA accommodations.
112 Tucker, supranote 111 (arguing that Hobby Lobby's reasoning "is broadly stated with
no distinction and will prove to be powerful arrows in the quiver of future litigants wanting
to extend the scope of the holding to other entities").
113The process of appealing an NLRB determination that a group of employees are
eligible to form a union is cumbersome, exacerbating the problem of long-term uncertainty.
That process is as follows: First, an NLRB regional director is responsible for making the
initial determination of whether to order a union election. The NLRB may grant review over
that determination, but there is no circuit court review available. If the NLRB finds that it
has jurisdiction, then the election proceeds. If the union wins, the employer's duty to
bargain in good faith is triggered. If the employer violates that obligation, the Board may
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employees' initial support for union representation may have eroded over
time-possibly to the point of non-existence-by the time the decision is final.
Conversely, where an employer is found to be exempt from the NLRA (either
in general or with respect to a particular set of employees), the initial
union
14
drive and its attendant collateral damage will have been unnecessary.'
Second, this uncertainty is compounded by the fact that some applications of
Catholic Bishop are inconsistent with principles espoused by Justice Kennedy,
a potential swing vote in any case conceming religious exemptions from labor
law. The Court-and in particular Justice Kennedy-has expressed significant
distaste for statutory schemes that dispense civil liberties protections based on
corporate form. This distaste is most well known in the First Amendment
context.' 15 However, Justice Kennedy's Hobby Lobby concurrence expressed

pursue an unfair labor practice charge against the employer. If the Board sustains the charge,
the employer may then appeal the finding to a circuit court, at which point the employer can
raise the question of whether the NLRB had jurisdiction in the first place. In other words,
circuit court review of an NLRB decision to accept jurisdiction in a particular case is
available only if the employees ultimately vote in favor of representation, and the employer
then refuses to bargain with the newly certified union. This process-in which the Board
orders an election, the union wins the election, and the employer refuses to bargain,
eventually defending the ensuing unfair labor practice charge on religious exemption
grounds-may take years. Moreover, if the NLRB determines that the employees are not
eligible to form a union, then there is no way for the union to obtain review from a circuit
court. In this scenario, each particular dispute is resolved more quickly, but long-term
uncertainty may develop, as Board precedent becomes entrenched without the benefit of
circuit court (much less Supreme Court) review. See generally The NLRB Process, NLRB,
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process [http://perma.cc/J7FL-P48J].
114 Kate Bronfenbrenner, a leading researcher of union organizing and union avoidance
campaigns, found in a study of hundreds of organizing campaigns that anti-union tactics
such as firing union supporters and threatening to close plants or decrease pay and benefits
are commonplace. Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensificationof Employer
Opposition to Organizing, ECON.
POLICY
INST.
1-2
(May
20,
2009),
http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dcl72ddl094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5WG7-G22E]
(finding that in the 562 election campaigns supervised by the NLRB between January 1,
1999 and December 31, 2003 "employers threatened to close the plant in 57% of elections,
discharged workers in 34%, and threatened to cut wages and benefits in 47% of elections").
Thus, union drives often carry real risks, and employers' responses impose real costs, for
employees.
"5 Justice Kennedy has repeatedly indicated that he views speaker-based distinctions,
including distinctions that turn on corporate form, with great skepticism. See, e.g., Sorrell v.
IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (stating that when a statute "imposes a
speaker- and content-based burden on protected expression . . . that circumstance is
sufficient to justify application of heightened scrutiny"); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 365 (2010) ("[T]he Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations."); cf Turner Broadcasting Sys. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) ("[Slpeaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they
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much the same sentiment, criticizing the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") for "distinguishing between different religious believersburdening one while accommodating the other .... "116 That some of these
believers adopted the corporate form for the purpose of making profits while
others did not was irrelevant to Justice Kennedy, just as it has been in the
speech context.
It is not surprising, then, that Catholic Bishop has been criticized from all
sides.'1 7 At the same time, while Catholic Bishop's reading of the NLRA is
weak in the context of nonprofit, religiously affiliated employers, it is utterly
unsupportable in the context of closely held, for-profit employers. The NLRA
has applied to innumerable such employers since its enactment in 1935, with
no plausible suggestion that the religious commitments of their owners bore
any relationship to NLRB jurisdiction. This incongruity simply illustrates the
problematic nature of Catholic Bishop; there is no principled stopping place
because the case lacks a sturdy foundation.
Yet, the Court has not revisited Catholic Bishop during the intervening
decades, and there is no indication that it will do so soon. Moreover, the
tension between the Catholic Bishop rule and the Court's rule against
discrimination based on corporate form is not so severe as to permit the
conclusion that the Court has sub silentio eviscerated Catholic Bishop. The
question, then, is whether interested parties must wait for the Court to reverse
CatholicBishop, or whether there is another way forward.
C.

Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: ConstitutionalAvoidance, RFRA, and
Catholic Bishop

Catholic Bishop has staying power because it is a statutory case resting on
constitutional avoidance; its holding has been immune to developments in First
Amendment law, and, as is discussed infra, Congress is unlikely to enact an
explicit overrule of a constitutional avoidance decision. This is in part an effect
of the decision itself-a rational legislator would be unlikely to spend political
capital on a bill that the Court has already stated to be constitutionally
suspect, 1 8 and, even then, the Court may resist the override in a subsequent

reflect the Government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers have to
say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say).").
116 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786 (2014) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
H7 See, e.g., Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for MoneyMakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 99 n.262 (2013) (noting that, while courts exclude
for-profit employers from exemptions under Catholic Bishop, there are few religious
schools that operate on a for-profit basis).
"'8 Cf CALABRESI, supra note 36, at 26-27 (discussing wave of new death penalty

statutes enacted after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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case. 119 In other words, decisions like Catholic Bishop risk undermining
Congress in at least two ways: first, when the Court adopts an implausible
statutory construction over a plausible one; and second, when the Court makes
it more difficult for Congress to override the Court.
This Section argues that the Court should view its adoption of an
implausible statutory interpretation as an overture that invites congressional
response. That is to say, once a court has applied a clear statement rule as in
Catholic Bishop, courts should be on the lookout for, and then broadly
construe, a response from Congress. If one comes, then courts should reverse
the earlier improbable statutory interpretation and start again.
Applying that principle would lead to the conclusion that Congress
legislatively overruled Catholic Bishop when it enacted RFRA because RFRA
constitutes a clear statement regarding the treatment of religious exemption
claims under the NLRA. Neither the fact that Congress did not expressly state
within RFRA itself that Catholic Bishop was overruled nor the fact that
Catholic Bishop and RFRA can co-exist should impede this conclusion.
Rather, the premises justifying the canon of constitutional avoidance
themselves call for a fluid interchange between the Court and Congress, in
which Congress can overcome the Court's statutory constructions with relative
ease.
I begin this Section by briefly discussing the various justifications advanced
by the Court and commentators for constitutional avoidance. I then turn to a
question that has been surprisingly neglected in the literature so far: If
constitutional avoidance is supposed to be part of a conversation between the
Court and Congress, how loudly or clearly should Congress have to reply?
This discussion forms the basis for my conclusion that the NLRB and the
courts should view RFRA as having effectively rejected and replaced Catholic
Bishop.
1. Why Constitutional Avoidance?
Proponents of the canon of constitutional avoidance have traditionally
proceeded from two premises: first, that judicial minimalism requires the Court
to avoid striking down statutes wherever possible; and second, that Congress
120
should be presumed to abide by the Constitution in its legislative drafting.
This conception of constitutional avoidance directed early courts to choose a
119 See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining CongressionalOverrides: The Hydra Problem

in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REv. 859, 877-80 (2012) (discussing the Court's
tendency to limit congressional overrides of the Court's own statutory interpretations, even
when Congress has spoken clearly of its desire to override the Court).
120 See William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 837 (2001) (describing early accounts of constitutional
avoidance as follows: "The Court should presume that Congress, as the lawmaking body,
has legislated constitutionally; and as an unrepresentative body should avoid inserting itself
in a manner that rejects the product of the democratic process").
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plausible, constitutional interpretation of a statute instead of striking a statute
121
down as unconstitutional; the choice was preservation or destruction.
However, the Court soon undertook a subtle shift: rather than deciding the
constitutional question conclusively and then approaching the statutory
interpretation question accordingly, the Court began to adopt limiting
interpretations in order to avoid answering difficult constitutional questions.122
Justice Brandeis famously articulated this approach in his concurrence in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
"When the validity of an act of
which the case may be disposed of ....
the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
123
the question may be avoided."'
Under this formulation, the choice is between two plausible readings of a
statute: one that presents difficult constitutional questions and one that does
not. The advantage of this formulation is that it does not require courts to
determine that one reading of a statute is unconstitutional, only to turn that
conclusion into dicta by adopting another reading of the statute. 124 Now,
however, the Court is making a different choice: rather than choosing certain
preservation or certain destruction, it is choosing between certain preservation
and uncertain destruction.
Catholic Bishop is emblematic of a further shift in the constitutional
avoidance canon: in that case, the Court avoided the constitutional question
based on the absence of a clear statement of Congress's intent to cover
religious employers. 125 That brings two variables into play in cases where
constitutional avoidance is a possibility. The first is the difficulty of the

at 839 ("Until early in [the Twentieth] century, the avoidance canon was generally
121Id.
about preferring a statutory reading that met constitutional scrutiny to one that was actually
unconstitutional.").
122 Id.at 840-41 ("[T]he Court moved to the rule of modem avoidance-that courts
should avoid interpretations even raisingserious constitutional doubts-in order to avoid
rendering advisory opinions on constitutional questions."). The degree of difficulty of the
questions in which the Court invokes constitutional avoidance varies dramatically. Anthony
Vitarelli, ConstitutionalAvoidance Step Zero, 119 YALE L.J. 837, 841 (2010) (contrasting
cases that "diverge on the threshold level of constitutional doubt that warrants use of the
avoidance canon").
123 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).

124 Kelley, supra note 120, at 840 ("[T]he canon obliged the court to adopt a different,
but still permissible, interpretation, which then had the effect of appearing to turn into dicta
what had come before." (footnote omitted)).
125 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20 at 632.
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constitutional question (and attendant possibility that it will be resolved against
the government); the second is the plausibility of the statutory interpretation
that avoids that question. "Modem" constitutional avoidance moves the needle
126
on both questions, with Catholic Bishop at the outer perimeter.
Catholic Bishop reflects a modem constitutional avoidance that is unmoored
from the values of judicial minimalism and fidelity to congressional intent that
initially prompted the development of the doctrine. 27 Instead, other scholars
have observed that modem constitutional avoidance reflects judicial activism
more than judicial minimalism; it is not at all clear that Congress would prefer
to have its handiwork narrowed through judicial construction, rather than run
the relatively small risk that a statute will be struck down. 128 As Judge Friendly
put it, "[ilt does not seem in any way obvious, as a matter of interpretation, that
the legislature would prefer a narrow construction which does not raise
constitutional doubts to a broader one which does raise them."'1 29 In the same
vein, Philip Frickey explained that constitutional avoidance "involves judicial
lawmaking, not judicial restraint; the outcomes it produces are at least
sometimes inconsistent with probable current congressional preferences; and it
will not always foster a deliberative congressional response.' 130 And, to Justice
Scalia, the aggressive form of constitutional avoidance is little more than a way

126 Adrian Vermeule coined the phrase "modem avoidance" to describe these shifts.
Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1949. Catholic Bishop is not the only case in which the Court
has aggressively applied "modem" constitutional avoidance. See Richard L. Hasen,
ConstitutionalAvoidance and Anti-Avoidance By the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. CT. REV.
181, 181-82 (2009) (discussing Northwest Austin Municipal Utility DistrictNo. 1 v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009) and suggesting the Court "embraced a manifestly implausible statutory
interpretation to avoid the constitutional question").
127 Kelley, supra note 120, at 846-47 (observing that "it is no service to Congress, no
great act of deference, to construe a statute in a manner contrary to its text and history in
order to avoid even confronting a constitutional doubt" and discussing Catholic Bishop as
prime example of constitutional avoidance that fails to defer to legislative supremacy).
128 As other scholars have observed, the Court invokes the canon of constitutional
avoidance unpredictably, adding another sense in which constitutional avoidance can be
understood as activist rather that minimalist. See Hasen, supra note 126, at 182 (contrasting
the Roberts Court's use of Catholic Bishop-style constitutional avoidance in some cases to
its use of "anti-avoidance"--in which the Court "eschew[s] a plausible statutory
interpretation in order to decide a difficult constitutional question" -- in others).

129 HENRY J. FRIENDLY,

BENCHMARKS

210 (1967);

see also Frederick

Schauer,

Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995) ("[I1n interpreting statutes so as to
avoid 'unnecessary' constitutional decisions, the Court frequently interprets a statute in
ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional questions aside, in ways that its
drafters may not have preferred." (footnote omitted)).
130 Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretationin the Early Warren Court,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 402 (2005).
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for judges to rewrite statutes in order to achieve their preferred results. 131 The
price of this approach is not limited to accuracy in statutory interpretation
(though that is certainly a significant cost); in a slightly different context,
Frickey and William Eskridge persuasively argued that avoidance of
"immediate constitutional conflict" comes at the "price of a candid ventilation
of constitutional concerns .... 132 Worse, constitutional avoidance decisions
often lack "the corresponding care that ordinarily goes into constitutional
decisionmaking in cases where the
court forthrightly acknowledges that such
33
decisionmaking is taking place."'
The traditional justification for constitutional avoidance is particularly inapt
in the context of as-applied challenges, like Catholic Bishop. When the Court
narrows a statute in the course of a facial challenge, it is at least possible that
Congress would prefer something to nothing: a narrowed statute to the risk of
one that is struck down in its entirety. For example, in challenges that raise the
issue of congressional authority to enact a challenged law, the adoption of a
narrowing construction through constitutional avoidance may save the
remainder of the statute so that it can be applied to others. 134 But when the
Court avoids a constitutional question in an as-applied challenge, as in
Catholic Bishop, the on-the-ground outcome is the same whether the Court
actually sustains a constitutional challenge to the statute's application to the
plaintiff or avoids that question. It is utterly implausible that legislators would
prefer that the Court read a statute in an unnatural way when the only possible
effect is to increase the chance that the as-applied challenge will succeed.

131 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993) ("The 'constitutional doubts'
argument has been the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause. Statutes should be
interpreted to avoid serious constitutional doubts . . . not to eliminate all possible
contentions that the statute might be unconstitutional." (citation omitted)); see also Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) ("The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into
play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be
susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing
between them.").
132 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 76 (1994) (discussing "super-strong clear statement rules" that protect
federalism norms).
133 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
ofJudicialReview, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1549, 1581 (2000).
134 For example, consider United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953),
which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal criminal statute, some
portions of which required no nexus to interstate commerce. Three justices thought it
appropriate to adopt a counter-intuitive reading of the statute in order to avoid the
constitutional question of whether the statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power
or else was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 451-52 (plurality opinion). Two concurring
justices, however, rejected the avoidance reading of the statute as simply too improbable,
and would have held the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 453 (Black, J., concurring).
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This evaluation of modem constitutional avoidance is damning, at least in
light of the judicial minimalism values that the doctrine was originally
intended to serve. However, scholars have backstopped Catholic Bishop-style
constitutional avoidance by arguing that it accomplishes other important goals.
Most prominently, several scholars have proposed that avoidance creates a
penumbra that protects under-enforced constitutional rights by imposing
hurdles on legislative attempts to come right up to the edge of what is
constitutionally permissible. 35 Ernest Young puts this function in terms of
"resistance norms," which protect constitutional values. 36 In his view, the
importance of constitutional avoidance lies in its capacity to "function much
like super-majority requirements by making it harder-but not impossible-to
achieve certain legislative goals that are in tension with the canon's underlying
value."'1 37 The canon's "underlying value" essentially incorporates the
Constitution by reference; thus, for example, when the Court narrowly
construes a jurisdiction-stripping statute in order to avoid a constitutional
question, it is resisting congressional encroachment on Article 111.138 Similarly,
constitutional avoidance might protect the underlying constitutional value of
non-delegation, because avoidance decisions often limit the interpretive range
39
available to administrative agencies.'
Offering additional justification for aggressive constitutional avoidance,
Frickey argues that it provides "an intermediate alternative between statutory
invalidation and validation,"'' 40 which preserves a role for legislative override
and allows the Court to move incrementally.' 41 In effect, avoidance decisions
lower the temperature on hot-button decisions that might otherwise call the
13 Frickey, supra note 130, at 455 ("Commentators who have considered the possible
normative justifications for the avoidance canon have identified... contexts in which its use
may seem particularly appropriate.... [One] involves circumstances in which courts, facing
institutional impediments to the exercise of traditional judicial review, use the canon to
protect what amount to 'underenforced' constitutional norms.").
136 Young, supra note 133, at 1585 ("[T]he value promoted by the avoidance canon is not
a general principle of interbranch comity, but rather the value embodied in whatever
constitutional provision creates the underlying constitutional 'doubt' that is being
avoided.").
137 Id. at 1596.
138 Id. at 1598-99 ("[T]he court is enforcing Article III-nothing more, nothing less.").
'39

See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Cmi. L. REv. 315, 331 (2000)

("The principle appears to say that constitutionally sensitive questions (for example,
whether a statute would intrude on the right to travel, violate the right to free speech, or
constitute a taking) will not be permitted to arise unless the constitutionally designated
lawmaker has deliberately and expressly chosen to raise them. The only limitations on the
principle are that the constitutional doubts must be serious and substantial, and that the
statute must be fairly capable of an interpretation contrary to the agency's own.").
140 Frickey, supra note 130, at 452.
141See id. at 462-63 (explaining that the avoidance canon can be "employ[ed] . . . to
truncate [a] statute down to its core purposes").
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Court's legitimacy into question in the eyes of the public. 142 Eskridge advances
a related argument that constitutional avoidance allows the Court to protect and
express public values by "updat[ing] statutes by construing them to reflect
143
society's evolving values as they relate to the Constitution.''
These appealing benefits of modem constitutional avoidance suggest that
the canon is valuable, even if it cannot be defended on the grounds of judicial
minimalism and fidelity to congressional intent. However, each of these
benefits is premised on the ability of Congress to override the Court's statutory
reading, and potentially force the constitutional question. 144 Thus, Young's
"resistance norms" are explicitly premised on the idea that congressional
override is "not impossible. '145 Similarly, Sunstein's concern with nondelegation makes sense only when an agency makes a decision without clear
guidance; there is no reason to make it difficult for Congress to give that
guidance. Quite the opposite in fact; "[s]o long as government is permitted to
act when Congress has spoken clearly, no judicial barrier is in place."'1 46 And
for constitutional avoidance decisions to preserve Court legitimacy, they
should genuinely lob the issue back to Congress, rather than simply
pretending; if the inter-branch "conversation" is a sham, then it should do little
1 47
to insulate the Court from criticism.
2. Overriding Constitutional Avoidance
Rejecting a Court's avoidance-based narrowing of a statute will be difficult
at the best of times; this is why a constitutional avoidance decision can serve a
resistance purpose. The numerous "vetogates" that a proposed law must pass
148
through create "an imposing obstacle to the adoption of national legislation.'
And amending a statute to address a single point will probably require a new
142

Id.

143 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1007, 1021 (1989). However, Eskridge criticized the outcome in Catholic Bishop,

characterizing it as a decision in which the "result 'rewrites' the statute and negates clearly
expressed legislative expectations that have not been undone by substantially changed
circumstances." Id. at 1066.
144 See Hasen, supra note 126, at 215 (discussing, but rejecting, the descriptive
possibility that "the Court will use constitutional avoidance only when doing so would
further a dialogue with Congress that has a realistic chance of actually avoiding
constitutional problems through redrafting").
145 Young, supra note 133, at 1552.
146 Sunstein, supra note 139, at 335.
147 See CALABRESI, supra note 36, at 12 ("The inevitable errors ... cannot help but raise

the specter of judicial, nondemocratic domination and cast doubt on judicial review .... ");
Krotoszynski, supra note 36, at 4-9, 46-52 ("[S]trict observance of the passive virtues is as
likely to provoke interbranch strife as to prevent it.").
1'

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REv.

1441, 1444-46 (2008) (listing nine different "vetogates," or points where a proposed piece
of legislation could fail to become law).
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set of legislative compromises; when the underlying legislation is
controversial, proponents could reasonably fear that reopening the issue to
override a court decision will risk losing more than could be gained. Then
there is the effect of the constitutional avoidance decision itself to consider.
Some legislators might be genuinely reluctant to pass a law that the Court has
already declared constitutionally suspect. Others could certainly use the
49
decision to score political points for their preferred position.
There is a final difficulty: the presumption against implied repeal. That
presumption "embodies a policy of hostility to the notion of statutory updating
unless the legislature makes that updating explicit. In its strongest form, the
presumption amounts to a sort of clear-statement rule-allowing for repeal
only by express provision-that negates the very notion of an implied
repeal."' 150 In other words, implied repeal "requires that before one statute is
held to repeal another ...the two statutes must be logically and physically
impossible to apply at the same time. ' ' 15 1 This means that in overruling a
court's statutory interpretation, Congress must usually do more than speak
clearly about the underlying substantive issue; it must also speak clearly about
its desire to overrule the Court's previous decision. Otherwise, Congress runs
the risk that courts will seek to reconcile the two, rather than replacing the
52
court's interpretation with the subsequent legislation.'
Applying these two canons together can create an insurmountable barrier for
Congress, particularly as Congress is de facto required to refer to constitutional
avoidance decisions by name in order to overturn them. Catholic Bishop is a
perfect example. First, it narrowed the NLRA in a way not anticipated by
Congress. Even assuming that this narrowing serves a public value by
protecting a penumbra around the religion clauses of the First Amendment
from congressional interference,. Catholic Bishop should have kicked the

149 Frickey, supra note 130, at 449 ("Although there is no consensus, one may suspect

that, while Congress can certainly draft a bill explicit enough to force the Court to reach a
constitutional question, support for or opposition to the bill will be based on policy
preferences that are either unadorned by constitutional justification or that embrace such
justifications as boilerplate simply because they are consistent with the politics driving the
support or opposition."); Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REv. 587, 606 (1983) ("[Flor the most part the legislators are
motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation that fills the perceived
needs of the moment. If congressional supporters can draw on the Constitution to bolster
their case or to create the appearance of a reasonable decision, so much the better.").
150Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the PresumptionAgainst Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF. L.
REv. 487, 489 (2004).
151Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration: How
Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, its Predecessors, and
its Progeny,29 BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19 (2008).
152See Widiss, supra note 119, at 877-80 (2012) (discussing ways for the Court to limit
congressional overrides of the Court's own statutory interpretations, even when Congress
has spoken clearly of its desire to override the Court).
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question of how to handle labor organizing at religiously affiliated employers
back to Congress, leaving Congress to contemplate the difficult, but not
impossible, task of overriding the case.153 Yet, it was a foregone conclusion
that Congress would not tackle Catholic Bishop. First, there is the fact that
while Catholic Bishop created uncertainty for certain religiously affiliated
employers and their employees, it left most employers untouched; from the
perspective of a legislator, the issue probably seemed unimportant. Then there
is the subject matter to consider: "legislating against 'religious liberty' would
scare politicians in the best of times and seems laughably inconceivable given
Congress's present dysfunction."'154 But the law of religious liberty has been
positively dynamic when one compares it to federal labor law, which has not
been meaningfully updated by Congress for more than fifty years. 155
If the only issue was that Congress was generally unwilling to legislate in
the area of labor law and religious liberty then perhaps we could simply view
Catholic Bishop as an instance where a resistance norm worked as advertised,
though we might question whether the First Amendment was really an area in
which a resistance norm was required. But Congress has spoken to the
question of religious employers and labor law by enacting RFRA, which
amends the NLRA along with every other federal law. Moreover, as I discuss
in Part II, RFRA provides a superior rubric for handling the objections of
religious employers within a Free Exercise-style accommodation framework
that focuses on specific conflicts between labor law and religious
commitments.' 56 Yet, because RFRA did not mention Catholic Bishop by
name, and because it is possible for the Board and the courts to apply both

153 Other commentators

have wrestled with ways of improving this interbranch

conversation. See Frickey, supra note 130, at 452 ("Various commentators have grappled
with the notion of provisional judicial review, the idea that the counter-majoritarian
difficulty could be mediated if courts had a means of suspending the legal effect of a
constitutionally doubtful statute pending legislative reconsideration." (citing PAUL R.
DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE (1989); Terrance Sandalow, Judicial

Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977); Harry H. Wellington, Common
Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some Notes on Adjudication,83 YALE L.J.
221 (1973))).
114Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two Life Rings and an
Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV.EN BANC 67, 74 (2014).
155Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv.

1527, 1530 (2002) ("The core of American labor law has been essentially sealed off-to a
remarkably complete extent and for a remarkably long time-both from democratic revision
and renewal and from local experimentation and innovation.").
156Cf Susan J. Stabile, Blame it on Catholic Bishop: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction
Over Religious Colleges and Universities, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1317, 1344 (2013) ("A better

approach would be for the NLRB to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction over
Catholic colleges and universities based on an analysis of factors counseling in favor of or
against its doing so.").
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RFRA and Catholic Bishop, the presumption against implied repeals comes
into play and the holding persists.
This means it is doubly unlikely that Catholic Bishop will be retired absent
further intervention by the Court, because there are two clear statement rule
roadblocks in place: one requiring a clear statement regarding the NLRA's
application to religious employers and another requiring a clear override of
Catholic Bishop. The effect is to turn a resistance norm into something closer
to a brick wall, undermining the justifications for Catholic Bishop-style
constitutional avoidance in the process.
A better approach to statutory interpretation in the wake of constitutional
avoidance decisions would be to weaken or eliminate the presumption against
implied repeals where it would serve to protect a court's handiwork rather than
Congress's. 157 This would allow Congress to respond to constitutional
avoidance decisions by speaking clearly about the underlying substantive
policy choice but not necessarily about the court decision itself. In effect,
instead of the presumption against implied repeals functioning similarly to
conflict or express preemption-in which a federal statute displaces a state
statute only if Congress clearly states its intent to do so or the two cannot
possibly be reconciled'- 58-it would function more like field preemption when
reconciling constitutional avoidance decisions and subsequent legislation. 59
That is to say, Congress's subsequent choice to occupy a substantive area
would displace the earlier constitutional avoidance decision.
This proposed approach would not be appropriate in every instance. For
example, it would be inappropriate in cases involving old-style constitutional
avoidance in which the Court actually decides the constitutional question and
then adopts a contrary reading of a statute. Instead, this approach is most likely
to be appropriate when the constitutional avoidance decision involves a high
degree of speculation in the constitutional question and low degree of
plausibility in the subsequent statutory interpretation. Courts and
administrative agencies can apply these considerations on a case-by-case basis
to reconcile earlier cases with later legislative enactments, much as they do
when reconciling other types of legislative amendments that affect the ongoing
validity of earlier court decisions.
However, using this approach to reconcile Catholic Bishop with RFRA is
straightforward. Catholic Bishop should yield in light of Congress's later
157 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, this

approach could also be

appropriate in other situations in which courts apply clear statement rules in statutory
interpretation.
158 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-64 (2002) (discussing express and
conflict preemption).
159See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisc. Emp't.
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1976) (holding that because Congress occupied
the field of private sector labor relations, states could not legislate to restrict tactics that
Congress had neither endorsed nor forbidden, but instead left "to the free play of economic
forces").
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statement about how employers' religious objections under the NLRA should
be handled. This outcome is consistent with Congress's likely preferences in
that it jettisons the approach to religious employers' exemptions from labor
law that Congress never approved and almost certainly did not want, and
replaces it with the only approach to this question that Congress did enact into
law. Of course, it also leaves in place the possibility than an employer could
bring a free-standing constitutional challenge.
The next Part describes in more detail how the Board should apply RFRA in
the context of any employer raising a religious objection.

II.

RFRA, RELIGIOUS

ACCOMMODATIONS, AND LABOR LAW

Whereas the previous Part focused on nonprofit employers that might
arguably be exempt from the NLRA under Catholic Bishop, this Part turns to
how the Board and courts should apply RFRA to employers who argue that
they should be exempt from the NLRA because it conflicts with their religious
exercise. The Part begins with a discussion of Hobby Lobby, including its
controversial holding that RFRA applies to closely held for-profit employers. It
then explains how to apply RFRA in the labor law context.
A.

For-ProfitEmployers and RFRA

No court or Board decision exempts for-profit employers from NLRA
coverage based on the religious exercise of their owners. 160 However, this may
change, given Hobby Lobby's holding that RFRA applies to closely held forprofit corporations. 161 This Section begins by briefly discussing Hobby Lobby
in greater detail in order to provide a foundation for the next Sections, which
address RFRA's application in the NLRA context.
The employer in Hobby Lobby successfully sought an accommodation under
RFRA in the form of an exemption from the Affordable Care Act's
"contraceptive mandate," which applied to most employers. 162 The primary
question that the Court answered in Hobby Lobby concerned whether a forprofit corporate employer could impute its owners' religious beliefs, triggering
application of RFRA. In holding that RFRA applied in this context, the Court
emphasized that "protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby
Lobby... protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control
those companies."'1 63 However, the Court did not clarify the extent of this
holding, leaving various questions about the application of RFRA to
corporations whose owners had different religious beliefs, or who were very
160 This is not to say that no employers have attempted such an argument. See, e.g., W.
Meat Packers, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 444, 447 (1964) (employer argued he could not sign a
contract with the union because of his religious beliefs), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 350 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1965).
161Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
162 Id.at 2766.
163Id. at 2768.
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diffuse, to be answered in future cases according to the dictates of applicable
corporate law, 164

After concluding that Hobby Lobby and the other corporate plaintiffs were
covered by RFRA, the Court turned to the steps of the RFRA analysis. First,
the Court considered whether the mandate imposed a "substantial burden" on
the corporate plaintiffs. 165 The Court characterized the inquiry as whether the
mandate imposed "a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to
conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs . . 166 In practice,
though, the Court asked little more than whether the plaintiffs sincerely
believed that the mandate imposed a substantial burden, stating that "it is not
for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial."' 167
Next, the Court assessed whether the mandate satisfied the compelling
interest-least restrictive means inquiry. Assuming that the government had a
compelling interest in "guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged
contraceptive methods,"' 68 the Court proceeded to assess whether the
government had "shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal
without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the
objecting parties in these cases."'169 Here, the Court concluded that HHS could
simply provide contraceptives to the plaintiffs' employees itself,170 or else it
could require insurance companies to provide the benefits directly to
employees, as it already did when religious non-profits objected to the
contraceptive mandate. 17 1 Justice Kennedy amplified this conclusion in his
separate concurrence, stating that "RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of
an agency such as HHS on distinguishing between different religious
believers-burdening one while accommodating the other-when it may treat
both equally by offering both of them the same accommodation.' ' 72 However,
the Court did not require HHS to extend the accommodation. 173 This means

164 Id. at 2774-75; see also sources cited supra note 111 (discussing questions raised by
the Hobby Lobby Court's discussion of "closely held" employers).
165 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
166 Id. at 2778.
167 Id. at 2779.
168 Id.

at 2780.

169 Id.

Id. at 2780-8 1.
171Id. at 2782 (explaining that if a nonprofit organization certifies that it religiously
opposes providing coverage for contraceptive services, the insurance issuer must directly
cover such costs). This solution would ultimately benefit the insurance companies because,
as the Court noted, access to contraceptives allows patients to avoid incurring other more
substantial medical costs. Id. at 2782 n.38 (citing 78 Fed. Reg. 39,877 (July 2, 2013)).
172 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 See id at 2760 (majority opinion) ("The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on
the women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases
would be precisely zero.").
170
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that if HHS does not do so voluntarily, employees will be left without
contraceptive coverage.
By assuming that HHS could find another method of providing cost-free
contraceptives to the plaintiff corporations' employees, the Court avoided
confronting head on the question of whether RFRA requires religious
accommodations even when those accommodations would deprive third parties
of statutory benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. 174 However,
the Court gestured at the factors to be considered in answering this question,
stating that although burdens on third parties had to be taken into "adequate
account," the fact that a third party would be disadvantaged by a religious
exemption was not a sufficient reason to disallow the exemption. 7 5 Justice
Kennedy, though, expressed a greater reluctance to burden third parties,
observing that employers' free exercise may not "unduly restrict other persons,
such as employees, in protecting their own interests ....
Finally, Hobby Lobby emphasized that its holding was "very specific," and
that it did not authorize "for-profit corporations and other commercial
enterprises [to] 'opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge
incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.""' 177 Similarly, the
Court stated that its decision would not necessarily lead to religious
such as those
involving
exemptions from
other requirements,
immunizations. 7 8 Further, Justice Kennedy began his concurring opinion by
emphasizing that "the Court's opinion does not have the breadth and sweep
1 79
ascribed to it by the respectful and powerful dissent."'
Thus, Hobby Lobby leaves in its wake a set of questions that will
undoubtedly be hotly contested in a variety of contexts, including labor law. In
the remainder of this Article, I discuss how to resolve potential conflicts
between employers' religious rights under RFRA and employees' collective
bargaining rights under the NLRA.
B.

FactualPredicates:Sincere Religious Beliefs

Any person (corporate or otherwise) claiming entitlement to a RFRA
exemption must first establish a sincere religious belief that is substantially
burdened by applicable federal law. This formulation requires claimants to
fulfill three parts of a prima facie case: that their beliefs are (1) sincere, (2)

174

See id.at 2781 n.37 ("In any event, our decision in these cases need not result in any

detrimental effect on any third party . .. [T]he Government can readily arrange for other
methods of providing contraceptives ... .
175Id.
176 Id.at

2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

177Id.at 2760 (majority opinion) (quoting id.
at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
178

Id. at 2783 ("Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported

by different interests (for example, the need to combat infectious diseases) and may involve
different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.").
179Id.at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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religious rather than secular, and (3) substantially burdened. Of these factual
questions, only the third was presented in Hobby Lobby, when HHS argued
that the plaintiff corporations' religious objection to abortion was not
substantially burdened by the obligation to include contraceptive coverage in
their insurance policies. However, the Court rejected that argument, instead
crediting the plaintiffs' religious beliefs that contraceptives were
abortifacients. 180 Thus, the "substantial burden" inquiry largely collapses into
the other two questions-whether the relevant beliefs are sincerely held, and
whether they are religious.
Accordingly, this Section discusses courts' existing approaches to answering
two key questions: whether beliefs that conflict with the requirements of
generally applicable law are religious, and whether they are sincerely held. It
then discusses whether the NLRA is the least restrictive way of fulfilling a
compelling
government
interest, and-assuming
it is not-what
accommodations might be available to religious employers.
1.

Religious or Political Beliefs?

A broad range of arguably religious beliefs might form the basis of RFRA
claims for exemption from labor law. To take an easy example, as early as the
early 1930s, Anabaptist and Mennonite leaders both condemned membership
in labor unions and sought to discourage labor unions from forming in
businesses owned by co-religionists. 81' Seventh Day Adventists have long
taken a similar position. 182 It is a straightforward matter to categorize such
beliefs, when held by modem-day adherents of those faiths, as religious. 183
Thus, when a hospital managed by the Seventh Day Adventist Church argued
that it should be exempt from the NLRA under RFRA, the NLRB had no
difficulty in categorizing the objection as religious in nature, even though it
184
ultimately rejected the employer's RFRA claim.

...See id at 2775 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that the parties in the case "have a

sincere religious belief that life begins at conception").
181 DONALD B. KRAYBILL, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMISH, BRETHREN, HUTTERITES,

AND MENNONITES 123 (2010) (attributing Anabaptist avoidance of labor unions to their

belief in nonresistance and their reluctance to join secret societies).
182

Religious Objections to Labor Union Membership, CHURCH STATE COUNCIL,

http://www.churchstate.org/index.php?id=226 [http://perma.cc/36AN-46AR].
183See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (holding
that an individual's religious beliefs need not be in accord with institutional church
doctrine).
184 Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 332 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (2000) ("[A]lthough the Employer's
primary purpose is secular, we will assume for purposes of the decision that asserting
jurisdiction over the Employer creates a 'substantial burden' on the Employer's free
exercise of religion within the meaning of RFRA."). The Board ultimately concluded that
the hospital was not entitled to an accommodation based on its conclusion that the NLRA
was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. Id. at 614.
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The more difficult cases involve intertwined religious and political beliefs.
Such entanglement is a common occurrence because both religious institutions
and unions are frequently involved in electoral politics. For example, Peter
Montgomery describes a manual produced by the Christian Coalition (a selfdescribed "conservative grassroots political organization[]" 85), stating that
"Christians have a responsibility to submit to the authority of their
employers. ' 186 That directive seems to be aimed at employees rather than
employers, but one might imagine an employer arguing that this principle is
inconsistent with its own obligation under the NLRA to bargain over terms and
conditions of employment with a union. Even further towards the "political"
end of the spectrum is another Christian Coalition publication that urges
members to support anti-union legislation because of the labor movement's
support of "the effort to normalize homosexuality.' 87 One might imagine a
similar argument urging religious adherents who oppose abortion to also
oppose labor unions because of their support of pro-choice candidates. That
argument would go as follows: refusal to bargain with a union would prevent
employees from becoming union members, which would deprive the union of
88
money that might ultimately be contributed to pro-choice candidates.
Despite the potential complexity of the question, RFRA itself says very little
about what beliefs qualify as "religious." In particular, RFRA does not contain
its own definition of religion, 189 leaving courts to borrow from other areas of
http://www.cc.org/aboutus
185 About Us, CHRISTIAN COALITION OF AMERICA,
[http://perma.cc/9XA2-69B6].
186 Peter Montgomery, Jesus Hates Taxes: Biblical Capitalism Created Fertile AntiUnion Soil, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Mar. 15, 2011), http://religiondispatches.org/jesus-hatestaxes-biblical-capitalism-created-fertile-anti-union-soil [http://perma.cc/3MFU-WUGR].
187 Hans Johnson, Does God Hate Unions?, IN THESE TIMES (May 29, 2000),
http://inthesetimes.com/issue/24/13/johnson2413b.html [http://perma.cc/22ZK-F8DF]; see
also Kathryn Jean Lopez, Keeping Faith With Labor: Can Unions and Churches Maintain
RES.
CTR.,
Friendship?,
CATHOLIC
EDUC.
Their
Longtime
http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/religion-and-philosophy/social-justice/keeping-faithwith-labor-can-unions-and-churches-maintain-their-longtime-friendship.html
[http://perma.cc/RG3U-4YQA] (describing a Southern Baptist's objection to union
membership due to the union's political stances).
188While this is an attenuated burden on religious practice, similar arguments have been
advanced. Wheaton College objected to notifying the federal government of its objection to
providing contraceptive coverage, because doing so would cause another source to provide
the coverage. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a set of seven cases presenting this
question. Miscellaneous Order (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/1 10615 zrj4ek.pdf [http://perma.cc/JQ4G-WTJ6].
1819
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (2012) ("As used in this chapter ... the term 'exercise of
religion' means religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title."). RFRA
incorporates the definition of "exercise of religion" from the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act. Pub L. No. 106-274, §§ 7-8, 114 Stat. 806-07 (2000) (codified
principally at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2012)) (defining "religious exercise" as including "any

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 96:109

law. One such possible source is the body of case law interpreting the federal
conscientious objector statute, which exempts from service in the armed forces
individuals who "by reason of their religious training and belief are
conscientiously opposed to war in any form." 190 For example, in United States
v. Seeger, the Court held that in order to determine which beliefs qualified as
religious, courts should look to "whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by
the orthodox belief in God... ."191 "Thus, a genuinely held belief that involves
matters of the afterlife, spirituality, or the soul, among other possibilities,
-192 In Welsh v. United States, 193 the Court noted
qualifies as a religion ....
that opposition to war could qualify as "religious" under the same statute as
long as that opposition stemmed from "moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about
what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of
1' 94
traditional religious convictions."
This definition is broad but not limitless, and the Court rightly shies away
from drawing lines between "religious" and "non-religious" beliefs. The
Seeger Court observed that Congress was "embrac[ing] all religions," while
excluding "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views." 195
Similarly, in upholding the Selective Service Act's requirement that
conscientious objectors religiously oppose all war (and not just particular wars)
against Establishment and Free Exercise challenges, the Court stated that
"opposition to a particular war may more likely be political and
1 96
nonconscientious, than otherwise."'

While these cases leave countless questions unresolved, 197 they also suggest
a dividing line: religion should be separable from electoral politics. The
contrary rule would be extremely difficult to administer: religious exemptions
would turn on changeable political party platforms. 98 At minimum, such a rule
would exclude religious employers who object to the possibility that unions
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief'). While this definition implies that the statute should be construed broadly on this
point, it also does not define the term.
190United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164-65 (1965).
191Id.at 165-66.

192 Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing definition of "religion" in Title VII context).
193398 U.S. 333 (1970).

194Id.at 339-40.
195Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165.

196Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971).
197See generally Chris Naticchia, Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument
About Abortion, Euthanasia,and Individual Freedom, 10 J.L. & POL. 339, 344 & nn.29-33

(1994) (book review) (compiling scholarly articles debating the constitutional definition of
religion).
198Id.at 343 (stating that a constitutional definition of religion must, among other things,
involve beliefs that are "distinguishable from political [beliefs]").
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will spend money in support of mostly Democratic politicians. It leaves in
play, however, the other examples discussed above, including the religious
employer who believes he or she has a biblically based obligation not to
bargain but instead to set wages and working conditions unilaterally.
Of course, some of these beliefs closely coincide with employers' own
secular interests, raising the question of whether they are sincerely held. The
next Section takes up that question.
2. Sincere or Insincere Religious Beliefs?
The Hobby Lobby Court held that "a corporation's pretextual assertion of a
religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would
fail." 199 But how will a court or administrative agency separate sincere from
insincere religious objections? The question was not presented in Hobby Lobby
itself and the Court offered relatively little guidance. Instead, the Court limited
itself to citing a Tenth Circuit case deciding that two individuals were insincere
in their religious defense to a marijuana trafficking charge 200 and observed that
courts regularly adjudicate sincerity issues in the prisoner free exercise
context. 20 1 Thus, to the extent the Court signaled at all how sincerity should be
handled in the corporate context, it directed lower courts and administrative
agencies to adapt the inquiry from the individual context. This approach is
unsurprising, considering that the Hobby Lobby Court viewed the case through
the lens of individual corporate owners who would benefit from corporate
religious exemptions. In other words, the real inquiry for the Hobby Lobby
majority was whether the individuals controlling a closely held corporation
held sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with their obligations under
federal law.
The difficulty of assessing whether subjective religious beliefs are sincere is
palpable. 20 2 Reflecting on the difficulty of applying standard methods of
assessing intent or belief to religious questions, Justice Jackson expressed
frustration: "[A]s a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see how we
can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is
believable. '20 3 Yet, courts must assess sincerity in a variety of contexts. 20 4 The

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014).
Id. (citing United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 718-19 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 2774 ("If Congress thought the federal courts were up to the job of dealing with

199 Burwell
200
201

insincere prisoner claims, there is no reason to believe that Congress limited RFRA's reach
out of concern for the seemingly less difficult task of doing the same in corporate cases.").
202 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of nd., Ind. Emp't See. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
203 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
204 RFRA is far from the only situation in which courts must assess religious sincerity.
Title VII, for example, protects religious employees from discrimination, and entitles them
to accommodations of their sincerely held religious beliefs in relatively narrow
§
12-I.A.2
(2008),
EEOC,
COMPLIANCE
MANUAL
circumstances.
[http://perma.cc/268Xhttp://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html#Toc203359488
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sincerity of business owners' opposition to the requirements of the NRLA will
simply be another instance in which a factfinder must undertake this difficult
inquiry. 205 Accordingly, this Section considers what types of factual evidence
might lead to the conclusion that an employer is or is not sincere in its religious
objection to complying with the NLRA.
The sincerity inquiry can be relatively simple when the claimed religious
accommodation would not yield secular benefits or, at minimum, when the
secular benefits would be offset by other secular disadvantages. 20 6 The D.C.
Circuit nodded to this relationship in University of Great Falls v. NLRB when

it stated: "While public religious identification will no doubt attract some
students and faculty to the institution, it will dissuade others. In other words, it
comes at a cost. ' 20 7 Similarly, workers who are entitled to a religious
exemption from union dues or fees are usually required to pay an equivalent
amount to a charity. 208 Again, the reason is clear-the substitution removes the
financial incentive to claim a false religious objection to paying union dues or
fees. 209 Conversely, the Supreme Court held in Hosanna-Tabor that school
employee Cheryl Perich was a minister whose firing could not give rise to
YVYG] [hereinafter EEOC Manual] (explaining that Title VII requires employers to
accommodate "sincerely held" religious beliefs and stating that although there must be a
sincerity inquiry, "the 'sincerity' of an employee's stated religious belief is usually not in
dispute"); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (discussing sincerity
element of a conscientious objector statute).
205 The fact that NLRB administrative law judges, rather than a court, will be
undertaking the inquiry should not be cause for concern. These judges are experienced in
assessing similar questions of motivation. For example, unfair labor practice cases regularly
call upon them to determine an employer's motivation in firing or punishing a pro-union
employee. Similarly, unfair labor practices involving alleged breaches of the duty to bargain
in good faith require determinations about whether the employer or union had the
appropriate mindset in bargaining. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1970)
(holding the duty to bargain in good faith does not require parties to agree to any particular
substantive contract terms, but rather to accept and reject bargaining proposals for legitimate
business reasons, rather than for the purpose of frustrating agreement).
206See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception,
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage,and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C.
L. REv. 1417, 1450-51 (2012) ("Many claims for [religious exemptions] ... seek the ability
to perform an act that is not only personally burdensome, but meaningless apart from the
religious faith that gives the act meaning.").
207 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (2002). This is not to say the D.C. Circuit's empirical claim is
accurate, but instead just that it recognizes that, in general, a religious claim that carries
costs as well as benefits is less likely to be advanced insincerely.
208See Reed v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 569 F.3d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that such a provision would not violate
Title VII).
209See EEOC Manual, supra note 204, § 12-I.A.2 (stating that an employer may contest
an employee's religious sincerity when "the accommodation sought is a particularly
desirable benefit that is likely to be sought for secular reasons").
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liability under employment discrimination law, relying in part on the fact that
210
she had received a benefit on her taxes that was available only to ministers.
Though she declared herself a minister to receive a benefit, the declaration
later represented a kind of admission against interest-having received the
benefits of ministerial status, she could not evade the drawbacks. Other
examples in which religious believers prove their sincerity by accepting
adverse consequences from both the state 211 and the market 2 12 abound.
But assessing sincerity in the context of NLRA exemptions is far more
difficult, given that many employers see "union avoidance" as having
significant economic benefits and few costs. Given that employers who break
the law while fighting union drives for secular reasons face relatively toothless
state sanctions and almost non-existent market sanctions, it strains credulity to
suggest that employers who invoke RFRA to avoid the NLRA will suffer any
significant market backlash. Perhaps in some cases the Board will be able to
look to whether the believer's broader system of religious beliefs calls for
other financial sacrifices. However, this inquiry often will not be conclusive.
In that case, the Board will usually have to look to other indicia of sincerity.
Courts have not developed a single approach for assessing religious sincerity
that could be imported wholesale into Board practice. 213 Instead, courts look to
a range of circumstantial evidence, 21 4 including the believability of the alleged
believer's trial testimony, the timeliness of the assertion of a religious belief
and evidence showing the religious belief pre-dated the desire for an

210 Hosanna-TaborEvangelicalLutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC 132 S. Ct. 694, 707
(2012).

For example, the objectors in both Seeger and Welsh were sentenced to incarceration
after they refused to submit to induction into the military. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
335, 338 (1970) ("Both Seeger and Welsh subsequently refused to submit to induction into
the military and both were convicted of that offense."). While they were ultimately granted
conscientious objector status, the fact that they apparently stood ready to be imprisoned
rather than serve in the military suggests that their beliefs were sincere. See id at 337.
211

Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 449, 462 (2013) ("[1]f the seeking of an exemption is likely to cause irritation
212

of superiors or colleagues that could down the road hurt chances for a promotion or informal
benefits, a person has no incentive to make an insincere claim."); Wilson, supra note 206, at
1451 (discussing "significant wrath in the marketplace" felt by individuals who object to
facilitating same-sex marriage on religious grounds).
13 Kevin L. Brady, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners
Recover UnderRFRA andRLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1431, 1433 (2011).
214 Whether religious beliefs are sincere is a question of fact. See United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (holding that question of whether beliefs supporting conscientious
objector status are sincerely held was one of fact). Thus, when these questions arise in the
NLRA context, they will be resolved in the first instance by the NLRB and then reviewed
by appellate courts for "[w]hether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to
support agency findings .... Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
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accommodation, 21 5 and whether religious leaders vouch for the believer.2 16
However, external evidence such as the testimony of a religious leader is not
necessary to the inquiry; some believers do not belong to a system of organized
religion with leaders. 2 17 Conversely, testimony of a religious leader may be
insufficient because one could attend church regularly without being a sincere
believer.
United States v. Quaintance,218 the marijuana trafficking case cited by the
Hobby Lobby majority,2 19 nicely illustrates the fact-bound nature of the
sincerity inquiry. In that case, the Tenth Circuit relied on evidence of

insincerity that included instances where the defendants referred to their
marijuana operation as a "business" and sold marijuana when they needed
money, the hasty religious conversion of one of their associates immediately
before a marijuana sale, and the fact that the defendants were frequent
recreational users of cocaine, even though their purported religious beliefs
related only to marijuana. 220 In other cases, including some of the prisoner
cases cited by the Hobby Lobby majority, 221 courts have decided religious
sincerity questions by relying on the believer's reputation and courtroom
demeanor, 222 as well as unexplained inconsistencies in the believer's adherence
223
to the asserted beliefs.

215

See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (opining that a soldier's

request for conscientious objector status, coming just days before he was due to deploy to

Iraq, at least suggests a lack of sincerity absent compelling evidence that his belief pre-dated
the application).
216 Brady, supra note 213, at 1453-54 (observing that courts assessing conscientious
objectors' sincerity look favorably on the testimony of religious leaders personally
acquainted with the registrant and analogizing to RFRA sincerity inquiry).
217 Id. (claiming that the testimony of religious leaders is "not decisive because religious
exemptions do not require believers to be members of particular religions").
218 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010).
219 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 (2014) (citing
Quaintance for the proposition that a pretextual claim of a religious belief does not qualify
the corporation for protection under RFRA).
220 Quaintance,608 F.3d at 722-23.
221 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 & n.29 (citing Green v. White, 525 F. Supp 81, 8384 (E.D. Mo. 1981) and Abate v. Walton, 77 F.3d 488, 1996 WL 5320, *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 5,

1996) (unpublished table decision) as evidence that "the propensity of some prisoners to
assert claims of dubious sincerity [is] well documented").
222 Green, 525 F. Supp. at 83-85.
223 Abate, 1996 WL 5320, at *5. However, other courts have observed that
inconsistencies in religious practices do not necessarily indicate insincerity because strict
doctrinal adherence is an impossibly high standard and inconsistencies can be explained by
prisoner's evolving belief system. Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d
781, 791-92 (5th Cir. 2012) ("A finding of sincerity does not require perfect adherence to
beliefs expressed by the inmate, and even the most sincere practitioner may stray from time
to time."); United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a

2016]

RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS AND LABOR LAW

Drawing from the types of considerations that courts have looked to in other
contexts, the NLRB may be able to assess an employer's religious sincerity by
looking to documents or testamentary evidence that predates a union drive or,
better yet, the employer's own involvement in business. Where it is available,
the NLRB could also rely on testimony from religious leaders to establish both
the nature of their religion's beliefs as well as the employer's sincerity in those
beliefs. For example, a Seventh Day Adventist employer today may still be
able to easily obtain testimony from a church leader about the church's
position on unions and the employer's length of membership in the church.
However, it will be much more difficult to prove the sincerity of more
idiosyncratic religious beliefs. 224 For example, while the Catholic Church is
generally supportive of labor rights, 225 an individual Catholic employer might
nonetheless take the position that collective bargaining is inconsistent with his
or her own interpretation of Catholic doctrine. 226 It is unlikely that such an
employer would have documentary proof of this belief; indeed, such an
employer may not have reflected on his or her religious beliefs related to
collective bargaining before becoming aware of the union drive. In these cases,
NLRB judges will be largely confined to making their decisions based on the
credibility of the employer's testimony.
However, there is one way that the sincerity inquiry could be made easier: if
successful RFRA claims produce accommodations that meet employers'
religious objections without also yielding substantial secular benefits, then
there will be little incentive to manufacture insincere objections. Accordingly,
the next Section discusses ways of accommodating potential religious
objections while simultaneously preserving employees' collective action rights
to the greatest extent possible, which will also help discourage insincere
claims.
prisoner's historical drug use and tattoos do not necessarily indicate insincerity because his
beliefs may have "changed over time").
224 This is likely to be a recurring issue as the Supreme Court has held that the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause extend even to idiosyncratic beliefs. Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) ("[T]he guarantee of free
exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious
sect.").
225 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops states: "The Catholic Church has a
well-documented tradition on labor and unions, rooted in the human right of association."
Selected Quotations from Catholic Social Thought on the Rights and Responsibilities of
CATHOLIC
BISHOPS,
CONFERENCE
OF
and Labor
Unions, U.S.
Workers

http://www.usccb.org/upload/Primer-labor-Catholic-social-teaching.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5F6P-R3HN] (compiling an extensive list of quotations from Catholic
leaders in support of collective bargaining rights).
216 See Brady, supra note 65, at 80 (arguing that although the Catholic Church is
generally supportive of labor unions, "Church documents addressing labor issues envision
collective bargaining in a radically different way than is provided for under the NLRA and
state labor laws").
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C.

Must The NLRA Yield to Sincere Religious Objectors?
Once a person has demonstrated that federal law imposes a substantial
burden on his or her sincere religious beliefs, the next question is whether the
government can show that the federal law is the least restrictive way of
satisfying a compelling government interest. 227 I take up that question here,
and conclude that there is a good argument that RFRA does not mandate
religious accommodations from the NLRA at all because the NLRA satisfies
this strict scrutiny analysis. However, recognizing that courts might reach other
conclusions, I complete the remainder of the analysis to illustrate how the
Board might structure religious accommodations so as to best balance
employers' sincere religious beliefs with employees' rights to act collectively
under the NLRA.
One topic I do not discuss is whether religious accommodationsparticularly those that burden third parties-violate the Establishment Clause.
There is already a substantial body of literature on that question, though there
is not a scholarly consensus. 228 Furthermore, Hobby Lobby did not embrace the
argument that burdensome accommodations violate the Establishment Clause,
though the Court did observe that the RFRA compelling interest-least
restrictive means inquiry should take into account burdens on third parties, 229
with Justice Kennedy making a somewhat stronger statement. 230 Accordingly, I
227 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2012).
228 For arguments that at least some RFRA accommodations violate the Establishment

Clause, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptionsfrom the
ContraceptionMandate: An UnconstitutionalAccommodation of Religion, 49 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 343, 349 (2014) (arguing that Establishment Clause forbids cost-shifting from
religious adherents onto non-adherents); Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1903, 1977 (2001) (arguing that Establishment Clause bars provision of certain
accommodations only to religious believers when nonbelievers are also likely to prefer the
accommodation); see also City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (claiming that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause). For arguments that
RFRA accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause, see Richard W. Gamett,
Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39,
45 (2014) ("[T]o the extent that the Establishment Clause does place limits on
accommodations that are excessively burdensome to the public or to identifiable
nonbeneficiaries, RFRA would seem to incorporate those limits into its standard of
review."); Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understandingof the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1839 (2006)
(arguing that religious exemptions are consistent with original understanding of the
Establishment Clause and can generally be made consistent with modem religious neutrality
principles); Laycock, supra note 38, at 1416 (arguing that religious exemptions that do not
create a public subsidy, either directly or via burden shifting, do not violate the
Establishment Clause).
229 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780-82 (2014).
230 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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take seriously Hobby Lobby's statement that cost-shifting is an important part
of the RFRA analysis.
The two-part threshold question-whether the NLRA is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling government interest-determines whether
employers are entitled to religious accommodations under the NLRA at all.
The first part of the question requires courts to assess the importance of the
government's interest in the NLRA's system of collective bargaining. 23' Then,
2 32
the second part asks how snugly those interests fit with the Act.
The NLRA sets out findings and policies explaining the federal

government's interest in establishing and regulating a system of private-sector
collective bargaining. 233 Those government interests fall generally into three
categories: (1) to improve working conditions and raise wages; (2) to maintain
the free flow of commerce by channeling labor disputes into a bargaining
system that is less likely to lead to strikes and violence (the "labor peace"
rationale); and (3) to allow workers to bargain effectively for improved

working conditions, thereby improving the economy by boosting aggregate
demand (the "worker voice" rationale). 234 This statement of governmental
interests was transparently drafted to increase the chance that the statute would
be found to be a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
power. 235 Still, the labor peace rationale persists in cases construing the NLRA
and other labor statutes, 236 and the Court has previously recognized that labor
peace is at least a "vital" state interest. 237 Potential hair-splitting about the

231 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1) (2012) (mandating government burdens on religion be "in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest").
232 Id. § 2000bb-l(b)(2) (mandating government burdens on religion be "the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest").
233 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
234 Id.
235 Id. (discussing need for collective bargaining to prevent strikes that impair "the

efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce" or occur "in the
current of commerce" and stating that "inequality of bargaining power between employees
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract ... substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce").
236 E.g., Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1986)
("[The] governmental interest in labor peace is strong enough to support a[] [collective
bargaining arrangement]"); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455-56
(1984) (observing that the Railway Labor Act's collective bargaining provisions were
"justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace"); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977) ("The desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public
sector .... "); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 812 (1961) ("Congress
legislated to correct what it found to be abuses in the domain of promoting industrial
peace."); Ry. Emp. Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233 (1956) ("Industrial peace along the
arteries of commerce is a legitimate objective; and Congress has great latitude in choosing
the methods by which it is to be obtained.").
237 E.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991).
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difference between a "vital" state interest and a "compelling" one aside, the
Court is likely to accept labor peace as a qualifying state interest. 238 Likewise,
the Court is likely to accept as a compelling state interest the need to boost
workers' wages and benefits and improve their working conditions and
providing them a voice on the job; indeed, at least five members of the Hobby
Lobby Court accepted that improving workers' insurance benefits by ensuring
that their plans provide contraceptives was a compelling state interest. 239
But is the NLRA the least restrictive manner of furthering those interests?
As to the government's interest in raising wages and improving benefits, it is
possible that, applying the logic of Hobby Lobby, there is a less restrictive
alternative available 240-- the government could legislate minimum wage and
other benefits, rather than requiring collective bargaining. However, as
Michael Gottesman has argued, minimum employment standards legislation
cannot be a complete substitute for collective bargaining because "[t]here are
vast areas of employee interest that can never be captured by such legislation"
and bargaining between individual employees and their employers will not
yield the same results as collective bargaining. 24 1 Thus, the government might
successfully argue that the NLRA is the least restrictive means of setting
minimum work standards that are responsive to the unique conditions within
different sectors of the economy. It seems possible, though, that at least some
courts will find this explanation unconvincing and instead conclude that
Congress could legislate broad standards that could then be adjusted on a more
granular level by an administrative agency.
Likewise, there is a strong argument that the NLRA is the least restrictive
way of furthering labor peace. First, the Supreme Court has previously
endorsed the view that collective bargaining arrangements can be the least

238 Although the Court has stopped just short of labeling labor peace as a "compelling
state interest," there is a line of cases in which the Court has treated it as such by holding
that it is an interest which justifies the infringement of certain First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302-03 ("[T]he government interest in labor peace is strong
enough to support a[] [collective bargaining arrangement] notwithstanding its limited
infringement on nonunion employees' constitutional rights."); Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455-56 ("It
has long been settled that such interference with First Amendment rights is justified by the
governmental interest in industrial peace."); Abood, 431 U.S. at 222-23 (holding that
although collective bargaining arrangements can have "an impact on [employees'] First
Amendment interests" this is "justified by the legislative assessment of the[ir] important
contribution to the ... system of labor relations").

239 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786 (2014) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring; id at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Government has shown that the
contraceptive coverage for which the ACA provides further compelling interest in public
health and women's well being.").
240 Id. at 2780-81 (majority opinion).
211 Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 70-71 (1993).
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restrictive means for advancing labor peace. 242 Second, there is persuasive
empirical evidence on the relationship between the NLRA and labor peace.
Michael Wachter has argued that "today's NLRA can be judged to be
successful because of the sharp decline in strike activity and related
violence"-violence that "paralyzed the national economy and frequently
required the deployment of the National Guard or federal troops to restore
order. '243 The mechanics of Wachter's argument rely on competition between
union and non-union firms; as he puts it, "[t]he ultimate deterrent to employer
opportunism is the threat effect of unionization. '244 In other words, employers
who believe they will be disadvantaged if their workers unionize will treat
those workers well to remove the incentive to unionize. 245 Relatedly, the
presence of some unionized employers who offer higher wages or better
working conditions than their non-unionized counterparts will lead nonunionized employers to follow suit in order to be able to effectively compete
for the best workers (whether or not those employers also want to avoid
246
unionization). Better wages can also decrease the chance of labor unrest.
These arguments should be persuasive; Wachter's research gives credence
to the conclusion that the NLRA is the least restrictive way of advancing the
government interest in labor peace. In other words, Wachter's explanation
suggests that, considering the economy as a whole, the threat of unionization is
necessary to spur employers to treat their workforce well enough to avoid labor
unrest. When employers are freed from that threat, the NLRA's labor peace
benefits in the non-union sector are lost.247 Furthermore, this explanation
illustrates a way in which the NLRA is narrowly tailored: employers are free to
make their case to employees that they should not exercise their rights under

242

See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302-03; Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455-56; Abood, 431 U.S. at 222-

243

Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act, in

23.
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

427, 427, 429

(Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) (arguing that workers invest their
savings in debt instruments like home mortgages which makes them more risk-adverse and
less likely to strike).
244 Id. at 447.
245 See id (describing the economic disadvantages of a unionized employer due to
"[w]age and benefits ... be[ing] raised above competitive levels and . . . [incurring]
transaction costs ...[due to] negotiating a collective bargaining agreement that will also
impose restrictions on its ability to manage its work force unilaterally").
246 For a convincing explanation of why increased income may lead to decreased labor
unrest, see Tayyab Mahmud, Debt and Discipline: Neoliberal Political Economy and the
Working Classes, 101 KY. L.J. 1, 42 (2012).

Wachter, supra note 243, at 457 ("Critical to the success of the NLRA is the
transformation of the non-union sector from a dysfunctional labor relations system that was
an incubator for riots and violence into one in which employees can trust the employer most
of the time to enforce the norms of the workplace.").
247
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the NLRA or to simply treat their employees well enough that they are unlikely
to feel the need for union representation.
Accordingly, there is a good argument that the NLRA is the least restrictive
method of furthering a compelling state interest-which is the same conclusion
24 8
reached by the Board and the courts that have considered this issue.
Nevertheless, it is possible that some courts may come to a different
conclusion in the context of individual RFRA challenges. This is because the
Hobby Lobby Court emphasized that the compelling government interest-least
restrictive means analysis is to be performed with respect to the person seeking
the exemption. 249 Stated differently, the question is whether the application of
the NLRA to an individual objecting employer is the least restrictive means of
achieving labor peace. But the labor peace rationale-which focuses on the
national economy as a whole-is in some ways a poor match for this
individual employer-focused inquiry. While some courts will likely adopt the
analysis laid out above, others could nonetheless conclude that exempting a
single employer from the NLRA would be unlikely to disrupt labor peace.
Furthermore, some classes of employers are already excluded from the
NLRA 25 0-a factor that proved persuasive to the Hobby Lobby majority in the

248 E.g., NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1306 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the

compelling governmental interest in settling industrial disputes); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v.
NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that industrial peace is a compelling
public interest); Ukiah Adventist Hosp., 332 N.L.R.B. 602, 605 (2000) (holding that the
NLRA is the least restrictive way of advancing the dual compelling governmental interests
of "preventing labor strife and protecting employees' ability to exercise their rights" to
organize under the NLRA); First Church of Christ, Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1007-08
(1972) (holding that "the avoidance or minimization of industrial strife which interferes with
the flow of commerce" is a compelling state interest).
249 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2013) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1 (2012)); see also Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006).
250 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (defining "employer" to exclude "the United States or any
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act ... or any
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity
of officer or agent of such labor organization" (citation omitted)). However, some of these
excluded employers are covered by other labor statutes. Employers covered by the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2012), are covered by definition, and many federal
employees are covered by the Federal Labor Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7211 (2012).
In addition, many (but not all) state and municipal governments allow their workers to
bargain collectively in varying degrees. See generally MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR.
FOR

ECON.

AND

POLICY

RESEARCH,

REGULATION

OF

PUBLIC

SECTOR

COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING IN THE STATES, (March 2014), http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-

2014-03.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9CL-GVNJ] (providing nationwide survey of collective-

bargaining laws related to state and municipal employees). However, the NLRB declines
jurisdiction over small employers that otherwise appear to satisfy the statutory definition of
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contraceptive mandate context. Finally, this conclusion might be particularly
appealing when employers assert that their religious beliefs provide an
independent motivation to treat their employees well, as the employers in
25 1
Hobby Lobby did.
However, the final potential government interest-allowing workers a voice
on the job-does not suffer from the same individuation problem that labor
peace does. There are at least three reasons that worker voice is likely to
qualify as a narrowly compelling interest served by the NLRA in the least
restrictive way. First, there is convincing evidence that Congress genuinely
sought to promote worker voice in enacting the NLRA. By speaking in terms
of collective bargaining and "the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes,"
the NLRA connects the provision of a mechanism for workers to exercise
voice on the job with the Act's key goals of improving working conditions and
reducing industrial unrest. 252 Similarly, the legislative history of the Act
reflects a concern with worker voice.25 3 Second, worker voice fits with the
individualized inquiry that RFRA directs. That is, whereas an aggregate goal
like labor peace might or might not be threatened if a relatively small number
of workplaces are not covered by the NLRA, an opportunity for worker voice
is lost each time an NLRA exemption is granted. Third, the case for the
2 54
importance of worker voice in the modem economy is compelling.
But the argument that the NLRA is a least restrictive means of serving the
compelling government interest of worker voice is not without its challenges.

employer.

See

Jurisdictional Standards,

NLRB,

http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-

protect/jurisdictional-standards [http://perma.cc/R6ZZ-MBQF].
251 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2757.
252 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).

253 See generally Laura J. Cooper, Letting the Puppets Speak: Employee Voice in the
Legislative History of the Wagner Act, 94 MARQ. L. REv. 837 (2011). Professor Cooper

details how the NLRA's drafters ironically failed to take seriously aspects of workers'
congressional testimony, even while they professed a concern with allowing workers to
exercise voice at work. Id. at 838.
254 See, e.g., Harry Arthurs, Reconciling Differences Differently: Reflections on Labor
Law and Worker Voice After Collective Bargaining,28 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 155, 164
(2007) (describing research demonstrating the "productivity-enhancing potential of humane
Human Resources policies and of empowering workers and listening to their voice");
Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case for
Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions,85 WASH. U. L. REv. 871,
913-23 (2007) (documenting the benefits of worker voice in relation to employee
satisfaction, performance and compliance, and the development of social capital both inside
and outside the workplace); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of
Private Sector Unionism: What Next For The NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1133, 1154
(2007) (identifying the importance of "structureless" employee feedback in the modem
economy).
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Chief among them is the fact that the Act is now severely underinclusive. 255
256
Many employers and employees are exempted from coverage under the Act.
And many employees who want to .exercise voice at work nonetheless lack
channels that would allow them to do so. 2 57 This is in part because employers
have become adept at defeating union drives 258 and in part because the NLRA
limits collective voice schemes short of unionization.25 9 Thus, Benjamin Sachs
'260
wrote in 2008 that "most scholars believe that the NLRA is a failed regime.
Fifteen years before that, Michael Gottesman "despaired" about the dramatic
decline of the NLRA and union representation in the United States over the
previous several decades. 26 1 To be sure the NLRA is an imperfect mechanism
for workers to exercise collective voice. Yet, it would be perverse to abandon
worker voice as a compelling government interest to which the NLRA is
narrowly tailored simply because employers have become adept at fighting
union drives.
255 Courts view underinclusiveness as relevant both to whether the asserted state interest

is compelling-because a lawmaker advancing a truly compelling interest is unlikely to
leave many exceptions-and whether the means chosen is the least restrictive-because the
compelling interest is evidently achieved through other means with respect to excluded
individuals. See James D. Nelson, Note, Incarceration,Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny,
95 VA.L. REV. 2053, 2101 n.218, 2107 (2009) (identifying cases where courts have rejected
underinclusive policies as either not serving a compelling government interest or not being
the least restrictive option). Justice Alito conducted a similar analysis in Hobby Lobby.
Although he ultimately did not decide whether ensuring workers' access to contraceptives
qualified as a compelling interest, he nonetheless considered the fact that some employers
were exempted from the contraceptive mandate as a factor weighing against the
government's position. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. However, Justice Kennedy
emphasized in his concurrence that he deemed contraceptive access a compelling
government interest. Id.at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (excluding certain employers and employees from coverage
under the NLRA, including government, agricultural, and domestic employees).
257 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 3 (updated ed.
2006) ("[T]he disconnect between what workers want in the form of influence at their
workplaces and what they have remains sizable.").
258 Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union
Organizing Drives, 43 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 364 (concluding that management
opposition to union drives "is a key component in union inability to organize worker in the
United States").
259 Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
employer-created employee "action committees" violated the NLRA's prohibition on
employer-dominated labor unions).
260 Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law As Labor Law, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 2685,
2685-86 & n.2 (2008) (citing a list of similar statements by prominent labor law scholars).
261 Gottesman, supra note 241, at 60-61 ("Looking back, I can see the decline of the
NLRA was underway even as I began my optimistic journey.... The system of collective
bargaining that the NLRA promotes is invoked by an ever-shrinking percentage of
American workers.").
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Although I conclude that the NLRA represents a least restrictive method of
achieving a compelling government interest, I nonetheless complete the RFRA
analysis in the following Section in recognition of the fact that some courts
might draw alternative conclusions.
D.

StructuringAccommodations

Regarding RFRA accommodations in the labor and employment context,
there is one area in which both employers and employees should be able to
agree (at least in the abstract): the interests of all concerned are served when
accommodations are as narrow as possible, particularly if they burden third
parties. Of course, narrow accommodations minimize encroachments on
employees' interests. But, perhaps counterintuitively, religious employers are
also better off when RFRA accommodations are narrow. As discussed
previously, the sincerity determination will be much easier-and much more
likely to come out in an employer's favor-if a desired accommodation will
262
not yield secular as well as religious benefits for the person invoking it.
Finally, the Constitution itself demands narrowness: Justice Kennedy has
observed that "a religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure
that it does not so burden non-adherents or discriminate against other religions
as to become an establishment. ' 263 Thus, five Justices (Justice Kennedy plus
the Hobby Lobby dissenters) may agree that RFRA accommodations are
permissible only where they do not burden employees. However, the
remainder of this Section proceeds from the assumption that courts may
entertain religious exemption claims that impose some degree of burden on
employees.
It is difficult to say exactly what a religious accommodation might look like
without knowing the precise scope of the conflict between the NLRA and a
given employer's religious beliefs. However, this Section offers some
suggestions regarding the procedure for settling on an accommodation, as well
as strategies for minimizing an accommodation's burden on third parties. It
uses as examples two of the most likely conflicts between an employers'
religious beliefs and the NLRA: first, the risk that a union will bargain for a
specific term (such as insurance coverage for contraceptives or abortion) to
which the employer would object on religious grounds; and second, the
requirement to bargain in good faith with a duly certified labor union in
general.
Accommodation claims are not unique to RFRA; they also arise in other
statutes, such as the employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities

262

Supra Section II.B.2.

Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Other
scholars have discussed in depth the boundaries that the Establishment Clause imposes on
RFRA accommodations. Supra note 228 and accompanying text.
263
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Act. 264

In that context, they are generally handled through an interactive
process-one in which a disabled employee and an employer exchange
information about how a job's essential functions might be restructured to
accommodate the employee's needs. 265 This process can be easily adapted to
the NLRA/RFRA context; in fact, as a statute that has bargaining at its core,
the NLRA is uniquely well suited to an interactive process. In such a process,
the person seeking the accommodation-here, the employer-would need to
come forward, identifying the precise nature of the conflict between their
sincere religious beliefs and the NLRA. 26 6 Then, assuming that the employer
was entitled to an accommodation, the employer and the union-or, where that
fails, the NLRB itself-would engage in an interactive process to shape the
accommodation. This process has two main advantages. First, it is familiar: it
would not need to be constructed from the ground up. Second, it is well suited
to the task: the interactive process would allow the Board to educate the
employer about the NLRA's requirements (which the employer might not
understand correctly, particularly if it is unrepresented), and the employer to
educate the Board about the precise nature of its religious objection-both
267
necessary precursors to arriving at an appropriate accommodation.
As described above, if accommodations are to be made available to
employers with religious objections to bargaining, the accommodations should
be structured to eliminate or at least minimize burdens on third parties. One
straightforward way of minimizing these burdens is to require employers to
substitute something else that is of the same value to the employees, yet does
not implicate the employer's religious beliefs. When the employer's religious
objection to labor law is the risk that a union will seek an objectionable
employment term during bargaining, this substitution can easily occur within
the confines of the bargaining relationship itself. That is, the employer can
simply tell the union what proposed terms it opposes on religious groundssay, contraceptive coverage for its employees-and offer a substitute-say,
increased compensation. If the union concludes that the two terms are not of
equal value, it can propose a different substitute. To be sure, this raises the risk
that unions might hold employers hostage, knowing that the value to the
employer of remaining true to its religious beliefs is very high. However, this
scenario is unlikely-unions cannot unilaterally impose contract terms, and
their negotiating leverage comes mainly from the threat of strikes, during

264 See

Jessica Leigh Rosenthal, Comment, The Interactive ProcessDisabled: Improving

the ADA and Strengthening the EEOC Through the Adoption of the Interactive Process, 57
EMORY L.J. 247, 256 (2007) (describing the interactive process in the ADA context).
265 Id.
266 See

Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the employee, or their representative, has the burden of coming forward and identifying the
need for accommodation).
267 See id. at 312.
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which employees stand to be permanently replaced by their employers.2 68 This
strategy is risky, to say the least, and therefore unlikely to create a major
obstacle to employers and unions reaching an agreement.
On the other hand, some employers may seek a complete exemption from
the obligation to bargain collectively with their employees. One significant
burden associated with such an exemption is the employees' lost chance to win
improved pay and working conditions. This is not the only burden-employees
would also lose the opportunity to exercise voice and self-determination at
work-but it is the most tangible and, correspondingly, the most likely to
prompt unscrupulous employers to make insincere accommodation claims.
However, this burden can be at least partially ameliorated. Good aggregate
data exist on the effect of unionization on employees' pay and benefits across a
range of variables. Therefore, employers seeking religious exemptions from
collective bargaining should be willing to accept that the price of bargaining is
paying their employees the wages and other perquisites (such as for-cause
protections from termination) typically enjoyed by employees who have had an
opportunity to join a union.
To be sure, this accommodation is imprecise; there are by definition some
employees who would have achieved more during bargaining and some who
would have achieved less. Yet, if employers are going to receive religious
exemptions from collective bargaining, those accommodations must take into
account the corresponding losses of their employees' opportunity to improve
their wages and working conditions through collective bargaining.
CONCLUSION

This Article has advanced a new, simplified way to address the conflict

between employers' sincere religious beliefs and the requirements of labor law.
First, a modest yet fundamental change in the application of the constitutional
avoidance canon would better preserve Congress's lawmaking function by
preventing entrenchment of Court lawmaking via the constitutional avoidance
canon. Applying this adjustment to constitutional avoidance should lead to the
retirement of the flawed Catholic Bishop decision, which essentially amended
the NLRA without congressional approval. In its place, statutory exemptions
from labor law should turn only RFRA's free exercise accommodation model.
Applying that model leads to the conclusion that religious exemptions from
labor law are, as a general matter, inappropriate both because the NLRA is the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest and because of
the burdens accommodations would impose on employees. But in any event,
courts can minimize both the incentive to manufacture insincere religious
claims and the burden of religious accommodations on employees by carefully
structuring narrow accommodations that avoid needlessly burdening
employees' labor rights. Often, bargaining itself will allow employers to
268 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (holding that
employers may permanently replace employees striking over economic issues).

160

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 96:109

structure accommodations through self-help. Where this is not the case, then at
minimum, employers should compensate employees for the lost opportunity to
improve their wages through collective bargaining. Applying these principles
faithfully should ensure that employees' collective rights are not lost as the
Board and the Courts apply Hobby Lobby in the context of labor law.

